

IN MEMORIAM—BERNARD MUSCIO.

WE grieve to announce the death of Professor Bernard Muscio, one of the original founders of the Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy. He acted from the first as Chairman of the Central Executive, and much of the success of the Association and of this Journal has been due to his guidance and inspiration. Through his premature death at Sydney on the 27th May, the interests of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand have suffered a serious loss.

Professor Muscio was born in New South Wales, thirty-nine years ago. He had a very distinguished University career at Sydney before proceeding to Cambridge, where he received a research degree for a thesis on Idealism and the New Realism, and was awarded the Burney Prize, open to all graduates for an Essay on Determinism and Free Will. On the outbreak of the Great War, he volunteered for military service, but was rejected by the military authorities for reasons of ill-health. From 1914 to 1916 he acted as Demonstrator in Experimental Psychology at Cambridge University. From 1916 to 1919 he was engaged at Sydney University as Lecturer on Psychology and Philosophy, returning to Cambridge in the latter year at the invitation of the British Industrial Research Board, to act as Investigator and Lecturer. Some of the results of his work in this connection were published as Reports in the British Journal of Psychology. His Lectures on Industrial Psychology, delivered and published in Sydney in 1917, were published in a 2nd edition in London, 1920. He also contributed articles and reviews to the *Monist*, *Mind*, *International Journal of Ethics*, *Philo-*

*sophical Review*, and other Journals. His contributions to this Journal are known to our readers. They show some of his characteristics as a thinker and writer—simplicity and directness of style, penetrating power of logical analysis, and a singularly effective gift for setting forth the points at issue in an illuminating way. From 1922 until his death, Professor Muscio was Challis Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, where he gradually obtained a great and growing influence as a teacher and lecturer. He was a man of very loveable nature, and his death was felt by his students and friends as a grievous personal loss. He married, while he was at Cambridge, Miss E. M. Fry, a graduate with First Class Honours in Philosophy. Mrs. Muscio shared her husband's interests in the fullest way, and has recently been appointed Tutorial Lecturer in connection with the W.E.A. scheme. Professor Muscio's mother died shortly before her distinguished son. His father, of Swiss origin, is an Australian citizen, resident in New South Wales.

We conclude by placing on record part of an interesting letter written by the late James Ward, the distinguished Cambridge philosopher, to the London Advisory Committee, who placed Mr. Muscio first in the list of applicants for the Challis Chair of Philosophy in 1921.

" . . . . Objecting as I do to the custom of giving testimonials to candidates direct, I am venturing to address what I have to say on Mr. Muscio's behalf to the electors themselves. I have known Mr. Muscio since his first arrival in this country: he has attended my lectures, and I have been in close touch with him all along. I have also read nearly everything that he has published, and have, as I believe, 'taken his measure' with some accuracy. His main interest is in philosophy, both theoretical and practical; but latterly circumstances—partly due to the war—have diverted him to working at experimental psychology, and there he has certainly made his mark. But he is anxious to return to his first love, and in the post he is now seeking, sees a favourable opportunity. In this, I think, he is right, for I regard him as born to be a philosopher. His earlier work—e.g. his degree thesis, 'Idealism and Realism,' his Burney Prize Essay, 'Determinism and Free Will,' the articles 'Degrees of Reality,' *Phil. Rev.* 1913, and 'The Hegelian Dialectic,' *Mind*, 1914, show his true bent. Whatever the subject with which he deals, his first concern is to plot out the ground by a thorough analysis. Of this trait his latest paper, 'Is a fatigue test possible?' a report to the Government Fatigue Research Board,



is a good instance. He reminds one here of Descartes, the spirit of whose *Tractate on Method* he has thoroughly imbibed. Another and still more striking characteristic of his mind, reminding me rather of Hume, is a logical sagacity that discriminates at once between what is asserted and what is assumed to be proved, what is really implied in the premisses and what is surreptitiously introduced under cover of contiguities in the terms. But Muscio is not a sceptic: in fact he betrays, so far as I can see no bias of any sort. This extreme judiciousness entails perhaps a certain lack, certainly a severe restraint of mere enthusiasm. But assuredly the man is earnest and absorbed in the quest for truth. In this respect he reminds me of Henry Sidgwick, who never founded, never tried to found, a school. Yet unquestionably, Sidgwick taught his students to think; and this, I believe, Muscio will do too."

We take the liberty of quoting, in addition to the foregoing, the following extract from a private letter received by Mrs. Muscio from Dr. Myers, Director of the British Institute of Industrial Psychology:—"That loss, however great it may seem to you, is not merely yours. It is not only ours; for Science itself has also suffered an irreparable loss. I can never forget that it was through your husband's pioneer lectures that I got first to know anything about industrial psychology. Professor Pear drew my attention to the Book. Hence Bernard Muscio was responsible for the development of the subject throughout the British Empire."

## THE CONCEPT OF VALUE FROM THE PSYCHOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW.\*

By H. Tasman Lovell, M.A., Ph.D., Associate Professor of  
Psychology, University of Sydney.

WHEN one says of objects, events, states of being that they have value, one means, I think, that they have been invested with value consciously, that is, wittingly. It seems to be thought that we know always more or less overtly the worth of the things we value.

As against this, just the reverse will be claimed here. Objects, events, and states of being tend to be invested with value for us in the first instance subtly and unwittingly, almost mysteriously. The sense of worth springs, not so much from logical grounds, as from our own being, from our own nature and composition directly. It is, therefore, as difficult for us to give adequate reasons why we value as it is for the moralist to unravel the deep-reaching complexities of ethical motive. Furthermore, is not our contention borne out by the marked differences and the strange peculiarities manifest in the curious turns taken by the likes and dislikes of individuals, by their devoted pursuits and their determined refusals? If the sense of value in any given object were the issue of clearly recognised grounds of worth which could be explicitly stated, then the only differences of value in that object for different individuals would be due to differences in intellectual grasp of the grounds of worth in that case. But I venture to say that in that event we, as individuals,, would agree far more than we now do in the values which things have for us. As it is, we differ almost fortuitously in the emphases of value which we place upon things. While one person is driven to attempt the salvation of souls, another is impelled to do violence to bodies and rifle them for gold. Napoleon lived for dominion, Shaftsbury for his fellows. One public man is corrupt, another cannot value his country's interest too highly. The same child will, at one moment, be so seized of the worth of its toy as to snatch it from a playfellow with ruthless egoism, at the very next moment, it will be offering its goods freely with outstretched hands. The extreme of this fickleness of emphasis is to be found in those rather pathetic grown-up children, the neurotic subjects. A returned soldier so emphasises with value the sound of the engine of a passing motor car that his great distress renders him demented, and he cowers in a corner and tries to "dig himself in." Another

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\*Read before the Sydney Branch of the A.A.P.P., Session 1925.



patient is for ever washing his hands, so that he is said to be possessed by a washing mania; he has an obsession; the most important thing in the world for him is to wash his hands, and to go on washing his hands for ever and ever. One is not contending, of course, that these odd differences of emphasis and value are inexplicable; it is just the task of the science of psychology to find explanations, and explanations tend to be forthcoming. The sound of the motor-car's engine recalls to the soldier the bombing aeroplane of the enemy at the front and, with it, all the distress of his terrible experiences there. The cleansing of the hands is the form unwittingly taken by an unbearable remorse for an act that has left the doer with a sense of moral uncleanness. The poor lunatic woman, who spent her whole time making the motions of a cobbler mending boots, was but a symbolic remnant of her faithless lover's calling, and of the way in which her own emotions had been afflicted by his desertion. But, while such explanations can be given, yet the subject himself is usually partly or wholly unaware why his interest runs to motor-car engines, or hand-washing, or is quite captured for some stereotyped action. Why he places so marked a value upon these things he cannot say; if he could, they would not master him as they do. No, the interesting fact seems to be that, in the first instance at least, value has its rise in our own composition, has a history bound up with our own growth.

Indeed, my proposition is that in the first instance, the value of objects, events, states of being is not determined by us, but for us by our dispositions. And be it noted that the word "disposition" is being used here in a quite technical sense. For, it almost implies a structure of mind, while it certainly has a structural basis in the nervous system. Experience has worn a system of nerve paths from stimulus to muscles, and along this system of paths the nervous impulse set up by the stimulus tends to run. Owing to the intimate relation existing between mind and nervous mechanism, the drift of the thoughts and feelings follows the direction of the nervous excitation. If, therefore, we have such a system of nervous paths they constitute a disposition, a neural disposition, with a corresponding mental disposition. The result is, that the awakening of the neural mechanism by stimulation will set in motion the corresponding mental disposition and give direction to our feelings. For example, the experience of the soldier mentioned above caused the sound stimulus of the droning aeroplane engine to pass to the muscles of the periphery and of the viscera which become active in flight and fear. The experience at the Front being intense, the impression made was deep. As a result, he came to have a psycho-

physical disposition to be aroused to dread by the stimulus of a droning engine. Indeed, so fixed was this disposition that under conditions of fatigue it was quite uncontrollable; he was, through that disposition, made the victim of his war experience, forced to give his attention to it, compelled to invest it with an intolerable value. We have the same thing happening upon a lower mental level in what has been called "the conditioned reflex." For instance, your terrier dog, while excited at the sight of his enemy the cat, hears you, his master, cry: "Cats!" That sound-stimulus becomes wrought in with the system of nerve paths that govern his reaction to cats. Thereafter, though it could not do so before, that sound, though no cats be in sight, will awaken the muscles to the prepared reaction and the dog will start up ready to pursue. He has now a disposition to be aroused to a specific form of activity by that specific sound. It has command of his attention; it has come to have a marked value for him. The dog, however, is very far from giving intelligent grounds for being so caught by that sound. The process is not one of intelligent calculation so much as the movement of life, an answering sensitiveness, an expression of growth. So it was, too, in the case of Pawlow's experiments. Here a dog, for whom the sight of a plate or the ringing of a bell had no interest, no food value, came later to respond with secretion of gastric juice to the sight of a plate and to the ringing of a bell. The sight of the plate had become associated with food brought upon the plate, just as the ringing of the bell became associated with the food, along with the giving of which the bell had been rung. Thus, these two once indifferent stimuli came to have a food value for the dog: it had a disposition to attend to them and to have its hunger and digestive apparatus excited to activity by them.

In all these cases, one has been giving instances of acquired dispositions. Of the same kind are *all* the unconsciously formed habits of men. We come, then, to understand how the attention may become attracted in many different directions, how, now this, now that object becomes invested with interest and value, how our feelings become drawn now hither, now thither. The extraordinary, even conflicting, differences of interest and emphasis, which we find so puzzling in the life of man, seem after all to be capable of explanation. They simply represent, in the first instance, the great complexity of form and direction which the urgency of life in us has taken. So one man lays much store by gold, another by clothes, another by reputation; one wishes above everything to wield power, another to be eloquent in expression, another to be a



renowned athlete; while there are some who would pass all these by for days of ease with a pipe and a book by a cosy fireside.

But you will have noticed already that not all our feelings are governed, not all our interests directed, not all our values determined by merely acquired dispositions. We have seen, in the cases of habit cited, that those habit-dispositions are for the most part woven into the structure of dispositions already present, like "hunger," "flight," "acquisitiveness," "self-assertiveness," and the like. In this way, to give further examples, a habit of good speech, or a habit of good form, come early to be grafted upon the already present social dispositions, leading us to communicate with and conform to our fellows. Now these dispositions upon which and into which habits or acquired dispositions are grafted, are known as native dispositions or instinctive dispositions. They, probably most of all, are the determining factors in our likes and dislikes, in our sense of values, that is, in the first instance. It has been claimed, not without some cause perhaps, that, in reverence, fear has been put to its highest use; that the spinster lady's devotion to animal pets is but a pathetic substitute value for the children of her flesh, which the conditions of society and of the world have denied her. There seems little doubt, that the first and deepest values are those of preservation of life, maintenance of self as against nature and others, with their attendant fighting and flight, home and offspring, acquisitiveness and property, construction and play, and so on. Over and over again, too, the attempt to relieve neuroses has required that the patient's symptoms be traced back for him to their origin, their unwitting origin, in the mishandling of some situation in which had been active some one of the great natural, or instinctive, dispositions. If what has been claimed so far be granted, it will not be difficult to subscribe to the view that our values are, in the first instance, unwittingly, even irrationally, determined, and that this source of value must remain in some measure throughout life.

Now, this conception of the unwitting action of preformed dispositions, brings us naturally to the next proposition. It is, that feeling is the touchstone of value. It will be contended that feeling is the primal expression of life, and the first form taken by consciousness. Overt intelligence, with its interest in logical grounds, appeared later, for, it had to wait upon a very marked development and intricate integration of the nervous system before its critical function became capable of exercise. I shall assume, then, that in the beginning of life's embodiment in matter, there was no consciousness other than states of feeling. (Of course, it may be questioned

whether one is justified in speaking of consciousness at all in this comparatively blind sense, but I shall ask to be allowed to do so provisionally). Living matter would then move towards and away from stimulating objects and situations in accordance with the principles of appetite and aversion. That this happens, is proven by the researches of biologists. For example, Mr. H. S. Jennings\* has shown how the protozoa behave in just this way. With so much given, the possibility seems to exist that the forces of the environment, working upon the yielding living matter, would compel it to grow fairly definite forms of reaction or dispositions to behaviour. Where the forms of reaction were unsuitable the primitive organism would be eliminated, merely because it was not adapted to persist in that environment. Finally, there would be left only those whose structure and function were a more or less satisfactory adaptation. On this view the instinctive reactions, the innate dispositions would be the product of world forces. And, while they may be the result of the purposes of the Creator, yet, as far as concerns the creature in which they exist, there cannot be said to be any intelligent purpose on its part, but only the feeling of comfort or discomfort, joined with the accompanying tendency to want more or less of the experience. If we could accept this, perhaps doubtful, speculation as regards the earliest form of consciousness, we should probably agree, that the sense of value can, and usually does, exist before the appearance of critical consciousness, with its clear knowledge of logical grounds. We should also understand some of the vagaries evinced by the play of value, why it bloweth where it listeth. At last, we shall perhaps comprehend the incomprehensible fact that man is for ever the victim of himself, of his own make-up, for ever destroying his own happiness, even his chance of immortality. Is there anything more pathetically helpless and deplorable than the almost universal spectacle of men doing some action now which five minutes afterwards they regard with remorse? Men not only do such acts because they do not know they were wrong, and only find out afterwards that they are wrong; but they actually, and quite often, do them knowing them to be wrong. I could understand even this, but that they should suffer remorse for an act which they did with their eyes open is merely perverse, unless we adopt the view that man is still greatly irrational, still greatly subject to his feelings of value, some of which have a strong primitive tang about them. When they have had their way of him, then only is there a chance for the more recently ac-

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\*Behaviour of Lower Organism.



quired, intelligent considerations of the more cultural life to express themselves in a judgment of condemnation upon what has been done. It would seem that man is in a state of transition from a primitive condition of being directed by the way a situation feels at the moment, to an enlightened state which allows him to take critical account of remote past and future considerations. Behind his so-called conscious mind, there exists a vast store of active dispositions with a history reaching back probably to the first appearance of life on the earth. And these multifarious dispositions tend to determine the way man shall feel towards objects, events, states of being, even before rational grounds come to be taken into account at all. The cricket, from which has been moved the covering log, runs about excitedly seeking a new shelter; the fish, scooped upon the sand, flounders vigorously. Either the cricket knows clearly that it has been deprived of shelter and must look for other shelter, or else it feels uncomfortable because its natural conditions of existence have been replaced by others to which it is not adapted, and is driven to activity by that feeling. Either the fish knows clearly that it has been removed from the water to the land, and must try to get back because the air is too rich out of the water, or it feels uncomfortable because its natural conditions of existence have been replaced by other conditions to which it is not adapted. That to which we are adapted and disposed has the feeling of inevitableness about it. With it we are satisfied, even if it be fatuous, so strongly do our already made adjustments commend themselves to us, so powerfully do they affect our judgment, though but a little thought would have shown us it were wise to act otherwise.

Conscious experience, then, begins in feeling, the meaning of which is not cognised, not referred to a perceiving self. That is to say, there is experience before there is self-conscious, critical experience. And that earlier experience has a value for life and action, though not for thought and reflection. There does, in short, exist an unreflective sense of value which governs primitive behaviour and renders it unwittingly selective. When, with the growth of discriminating perception, there appears a cognising of grounds of worth, this earlier, more primitive sense of value still persists, often getting its way in spite of reason.

The next point to consider, therefore, is the passage from a primitive to a critical sense of value, perhaps from a lower to a higher sense of value. This account cannot be given wholly in terms of psychology. Still, there is much of it that does come within the proper province of psychology, and with that part I

shall ask to be allowed now to deal, leaving the rest to my colleague, who will rightly and necessarily take you beyond the concepts of psychology.

It would appear to be the function of intelligence to provide the instrument whereby the passage from a primitive to a critical sense of value is made. Intelligence ensures that insight into the meaning of objects, events, and states of being, which leads to a fully conscious decision as to value. Two aspects of intelligence, respectively, play dominant rôles in such decisions. They are memory and imagination. Both of these cause the light of meaning to play about the object, event, or state of being, so that a judgment of value may be possible. Memory focusses the relevant portions of past experience upon the present moment: imagination brings to bear future possibilities. In this way the near is lit up from two sides by the remote; the present value tends to diminish and larger considerations to have weight. By this means, the individual is enabled to give a new value to the present experience, and to prefer the remote considerations. Thus is he freed from the tyranny of the present, of the near, of his dispositions, and rises superior to them. The higher values, therefore, belong to a life of freedom, a freedom which only critical judgment can bring. It is upon this second level that, despite seductive calls from our innate dispositions, we come to value more highly, honour, harmony, sustained happiness, the true, the beautiful, and the good. What, in the first instance, had a dominating value determined by a disposition, may now be disregarded in favour of objects of a wider universality.

While the possibility of a widening kingdom of spiritual values here opened up is extensive, yet the passage from primitive to spiritual values is not easily made by the individual, nor does the explanation just given do justice to the complicated nature of the process. As a matter of fact, critical judgment is not as a rule very freely used, except by the most highly intelligent individuals, or by those who have developed a sentiment for intelligently controlled behaviour. Critical intelligence has to fight every inch of its way against the brute values of preformed dispositions. For this reason, there arise inner conflicts in which values waver bewilderingly. The resulting value is sometimes that due to higher meanings, sometimes that due to the feeling which issues from the preformed disposition. Even when the higher value is uppermost, it has been secured in that position by a secondary disposition, or sentiment, such as that of self-esteem, a sentiment which may have been inculcated in no small degree in early life, not as a result of intelligent reflection, but as a suggestion received and accepted



through the prestige of one's parents and elders. But for the possession of a sentiment of self-respect, many a noble decision would never have been made, though there was present a knowledge of good logical grounds why it should have been made. In the possession of these higher dispositions or sentiments individuals differ greatly, so that we find a great diversity of emphasis and value here, too. Yet, there does seem to be a certain amount of agreement about what are the best things, about what should be valued most highly. In so far as this agreement exists, it would seem to be greatly due to the training we get, to the traditions of the society in which we grow, of the race to which we belong. This would tend to explain the marked differences in moral values which, as a matter of psychological fact, actually do exist in the same people at different times and in different peoples at the same time. I should like to conclude with an application of some of these propositions to some piece of practical living, for example, to the psychology of advertising. It may be true that the advertiser advances grounds upon which we may estimate the value of his goods. It is also true that some of these grounds are specious, some of them quite untrue. What is more certain is, that the advertiser knows how to play upon human nature, how to appeal to native and acquired dispositions in order to awaken interest and create a desire to buy. In this way, he is sometimes able, by psychological means, to invest the object with a value which is neither intrinsic to the object nor the effect of shortage in supply. With the advertiser's aid, it would be quite possible for a foolish person to buy his way into debt. The safeguard, here as elsewhere, is a reliance on critical thought, aided by some disposition like common-sense, or self-respect, or a habit of thrift. Then are we not "blown about by every wind of doctrine," and our scale of values becomes more or less settled.

## THE CONCEPTS OF SELF AND PERSONALITY.

By A. H. Martin, M.A., Ph.D. Lecturer in Psychology,  
University of Sydney.

THE aim of this paper is first to examine in outline certain current but independent systems of personality, viz. those of James, Freud, McDougall and Stout, and to collate the various points common or singular to each; second, to present from out of this material a reconstructed system, which assimilates their important features and develops these further in a manner acceptable to current psychology; and finally to examine the rationale of this amended system in the light of its application to other psychological phenomena. It should scarcely be necessary to point out that, in such an account, factors of cognition and volition are assumed as being generally operative, while the development of personality herein portrayed is that of a normally typical high-minded individual chiefly in regard to his affective aspects.

### I.—*Outlines of Systems.*

(a) *William James.*—The main considerations of this writer are contained in his chapter on "The Self."\* Of the two, the later account from the "Text Book" is perhaps more explicit and complete. He postulates four levels of conduct. As a basis for these are those instinctive dispositions that subserve the individual's primary needs; "Thus each mind must have a certain minimum of selfishness in the shape of bodily instincts of self seeking in order to exist. This minimum must be there as a basis for all further conscious acts, whether of self-negation or of a selfishness more subtle still." Above this level of instinctive dispositions appears the "hierarchy of the mes," the bodily "mes" at the bottom, the various social selves between, with the spiritual me at the top. He writes, "its own body first of all, its friends next, and finally its spiritual dispositions, *must* be the supremely interesting objects for each human mind." At the lowest level is to be found the bodily selves. Not only does each "me" or self concern itself with actual needs of the body such as food and raiment, but also with the family and home; "An equally instinctive impulse drives us to collect property, and the collections thus made become, with different degrees of intimacy, parts of our empirical selves. The parts of our wealth most intimately ours are those which are saturated with our labour. There are few men who would not feel personally annihilated if a lifelong construction of

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\*Principles I. Chap. X. Textbook, Chap. XII.



their hands or brains—say an entomological collection or an extensive work in manuscript—were suddenly swept away.”

Concerning the constitution of the social “me” or self, he is also very explicit: *“Properly speaking a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognise him.”* To each of these groups he turns a different aspect of his personality. *“Many a youth who is demure enough before his parents and teachers, swears and swaggers like a pirate among his tough young friends. We do not show ourselves to our children as to our club companions, to our customers as to the labourers we employ, to our own masters and employers as to our intimate friends.”*

The spiritual “me” or self is thus described: *“This self of all our other selves” . . . “welcomes or rejects” . . . through “some central principle” which tends to furnish a “palpitating inward life.”*

The regulative factors of the “mes” or selves appear identical with McDougall’s instincts of assertion and submission which James has here anticipated. He describes them as being of two kinds, viz. self-complacency and self dissatisfaction. *“The emotions themselves of self-satisfaction and abasement are of a unique sort, each one worthy to be claimed as a primitive emotional species as are, for example, rage or pain.”*

At the level of the bodily self these instincts function as vanity and ostentation on the one hand, or fear of poverty and “tuft-hunting” on the other. On the social level we find the positive forms in pride and snobbery, while their negatives are represented by humility and shame. When these factors attain the level of the spiritual self they have been still further sublimated. *“All progress at the level of social self is the substitution of higher tribunals for lower; this ideal tribunal is the highest.” . . . the individual realising himself as a socius. in an ideal world. This last is cognate with McDougall’s “refined gallery”; the ideal approbation of God, future generations, or society of rational beings, whose imagined approbation or blame acts as the final moment of the latter’s “self regarding sentiment.”* For James the positive emotions here consist of moral superiority or purity, with inferiority, humility or guilt as their opposites.

Concerning the number and relationships of James’ classification of the selves it may be said that they are ethical rather than psychological. The insistence upon the division styled “bodily selves” appears unnecessary. One tends to regulate one’s manner of eating or the clothes one wears in conformity with the society that one encounters, while one’s method of acquisition of property

or of pursuing one's career, is as sternly ordered by custom and convention as the choice of one's friends. Psychologically the bodily and social selves of James are so inextricably woven together by social processes, that it is impossible to disentangle their content and motivation without depriving them of all vitality. (2) Again, the relations of the bodily self to the social self are not made clear and explicit, but James would appear to imply a progression of moral values from the one to the other, as well as within each level.

On the other hand, the "spiritual self" is a distinct development in so far as it admits of an ideal moment which we may designate the inner promptings of conscience, in place of the real and existent or potential social approval of disapprobation. From the level of this latter appeal to the final tribunal we can agree with James that the spiritual or ethical self or conscience is distinctly regulative of the social "mes," just as these tend to modify and tone down the crude instinctive dispositions of our primitive nature. The great discrepancy in the Jamesian system is however the lack of content, as suggested in the development of sentiments as comprising the material of the various selves. This defect may be remedied by the addition of McDougall's system to that of James.

(b) *Freud and the Psycho Analysts*: The fundamental concepts of the personality system of Freud's *The Traumdeutung* appeared in 1906, and since then its main principles have undergone little change. The original concept has however been elaborated with very many minor mechanisms; these additions appear however, to leave the structure of the central system unchanged. The basis of the system is postulated as a type of life force or "hormic energy" as Jung would style it, or "libido" as Freud himself chooses to designate it. This force tends to find vent in action through the channels of certain instincts. The first of these is the "egoistic," really a generic term inclusive of all those that the regular psychologist would place under the head of "self-preservative." The second great instinct is the sexual, which for Freud forms the main channel for the release of libido. This includes for regular psychology the mating and mothering instincts, with McDougall's instinct of appeal and emotion of distress. There is a third, added by certain English\* and American psycho-analysts which has been designated the *herd instinct*. This addition has distinctly been made through the influence of Trotter's work ("The Herd in Peace and War.") It includes the gregarious instinct and those of submission and assertion, together with the "general tenden-

\* e.g. Tansley, *The New Psychology*, Chaps. XX and XXI.



cies" of McDougall—McDougall, W. ("An Introduction to Social Psychology,") viz. sympathy, suggestion, and imitation. It would appear that it is only through the addition of the herd instinct that the psycho-analytic system is able to account otherwise than arbitrarily for the presence of the endopsychic censor.

Developing through either one of these instinctive forms, the libido tends to become fixated or sublimated upon certain mental objects, these focussings of instinct operating much after the fashion of McDougall's sentiments. All these dispositions tend to involve some form of the sexual instinct, either naive or sublimated. The urges of the libido which are called into response, pass into the region of the preconscious, which psychic area would, probably correspond to James' "perifocal and marginal elements in the stream of consciousness," or Herbart's apical and subliminal ideas "in the dome of consciousness."

Between the exit leading from the pre-conscious and the conscious is the endopsychic censor. Before any individual expression of the libido may issue forth as conscious behaviour it must fulfil the conditions demanded by this mechanism. This ensures that only conduct which conforms to the sanctions of the law, religion or morality may actually operate as conscious behaviour. When the "wish," as the workings of the libido is technically styled, is not conformable to censorial standards of morality it becomes in case "repressed" to the unconscious again. Here it continues to remain latent till finally it issues forth in innocent disguise, taking on some other form of behaviour which will not offend the censor.

Scientific theories are not often invested with the zeal and enthusiasm which has been accorded this personality system by its inner circle of practitioners; again, too, undoubted cures have been worked by its applications. It does not follow, however, that the theories so stoutly defended or upon which cures are based are therefore fully adequate. Viewed coldly in the light of psychological theory the system appears as a naive and anthropomorphic description of personality. Freud's main and most valuable contributions to psychology—quite apart from psychiatric applications—lie in his calling attention to certain phenomena of irrational behaviour and their significance to personality, which psychology from its rational origins in so called conscious behaviour tended to ignore. At the same time the Freudians' over-insistence on the psychic universality of certain phenomena detracts somewhat from their full value as a contribution to psychological theory. For instance the insistence that *all* psychic lapses are due to repressions is unacceptable, even to

psycho-analysts such as Jung\* and Rivers,† and is positively rejected by psychologists, who have tested the lapse of memory material through the neural weakening of association bonds since Ebbinghan's experiments published in 1885. We may say therefore, that the Freudian system tends to corroborate the systems of regular psychology in general outline, but its main principles are bare and undeveloped, while its minor mechanisms, chiefly pathological in character, are over complicated. This very simplicity of structure so far as the main system goes is however claimed as a special merit by such Freudians as Dr. Ernest Jones.‡ Yet, to consider but one case, even the psycho-analyst differentiates in practice between the broadly sexual with its general connotation of love or affection and its narrower erotic phase. This is precisely the distinction that McDougall makes between the sex instinct and those of appeal and protection. While such distinctions may not much affect practice, they are certainly important from the standpoint of scientific theory.

(c) *Stout*: The doctrine of the sentiments was originally set forth by Shand in Stout's *Groundwork* (Chap. XVII) and thus provided a system of acquired dispositions built upon an instinctive basis of innate dispositions. Stout in the revised edition of his manual apparently ignores their importance, for they are not treated in relation to his exposition of the self.

In both the "Manual (Chap. X) and the "Groundwork" (Chap. XVIII), the self is regarded as a unified expression of personality which acts as the final moment in voluntary decision. In the realisation of this type of act the self becomes peculiarly manifest and distinct from the "not self," and is apparently identical with what the writer regards as unified personality. Thus, "Character is just the constitution of the Self as a whole. Character exists only in so far as unity and continuity of conscious life exists and manifests itself in systematic consistency of conduct."§ Such a viewpoint as Stout presents is true of an "ethical self" which is the crowning factor of a unified personality but affords us considerations in regard to non-associated personalities which have not developed this synthetic quality. Again no attempt is made to offer an exposition of any principle of organisation of the sentiments within such a self.

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\*Jung, C. G. *The Theory of Psycho-analysis.*

†Rivers, W. H. R. *Instinct and the Unconscious.* Chap. III.

‡British Journal of Psychol. Vol. XV. 3. 1924.

§Manual, pp. 734 and 738.



(d) *McDougall*: For this writer the basis of all dynamic force in behaviour lies in his seven principal "emotion-instincts" of man.\* To these in his latest work he has added one other† He admits also certain minor instincts, and certain "general instinctive tendencies," the latter providing channels whereby the instincts may be aroused by purely social stimuli rather than by actual instinct situations. Each of the instincts may be entirely aroused by certain typical stimuli. On the affective side their arousal is accompanied by a definite and typical emotion peculiar to the instinct. The response issues finally in a specific impulse to activity which is the objective expression of the emotion. The validity of this definiteness and specificity of each instinct in its three psychological aspects has been searchingly questioned by Shand. As later on, McDougall concedes that this definiteness is only common to a limited number of instincts, and that their perceptual and impulsive sides are obscured through "associative shifts" induced by experience, the value of this law is not evident except from a genetic standpoint.

The emotional core of the original instinct, however, remains integrate except for modifications by fusion. By process of continued association, native or blended forms become focussed on certain mental objects, and for such complexes he borrows Shand's term of "sentiments." Thus a sentiment stands as an acquired disposition of fused emotions which are attached to a certain mental object, through a variant play of the emotions upon it. In actual function a sentiment is never finally active until the stress of a difficult situation calls forth its full emotional potentiality, which under normal circumstances may remain latent.

Sentiments may be concrete—attached to actual things or persons on the one hand—and abstract or ideal on the other, their highest forms tending to follow the latter course. Finally the loftiest types of personality develop abstract sentiments for such objects as truth, justice, righteousness, or the "absolute." This final type of sentiment is essentially, as is the ethical self of James, "self regarding." It implies that behaviour will be regulated and moulded in such fashion as to win approval from a "refined gallery" who might whole-heartedly approve of such ideals, while on the other hand, the anticipated reprobation by this "ideal community" would tend to inhibit other forms. This sentiment of self-regard or self-respect, thus operates as the final moment in all weighty ethical decisions, and corresponds to James' "central principle" quoted above.

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\*Social Psychology. Chap. III.

†Outline of Psychology. Chap. V.

The genetic development of self conscious personality or self is carefully traced through definite stages: first the naive instincts tend to become moralised and rendered conformable to the social environment through the operation of fear and next through the operation of social praise and blame. Anti-social forms of behaviour are thus inhibited, while acceptable social expressions are encouraged. Conscience takes its origin at the point when these social expressions are anticipated. Its final development takes place when the social will is replaced by the will of an ideal community as expressed in a self-regarding sentiment. McDougall's concept of self is thus in line with that of Stout. His genetic presentation portrays it as a unified but developing psychic entity that expands with experience, each successive phase passing into the next or being sloughed off in the process of transition. The specific relations of sentiments to this self are not stated otherwise than as self content, except that the self-regarding sentiment of the individual acts as a regulative factor of conduct.

The weakness of the theory lies in the fact of over simplicity; the various sentiments stand as unrelated entities except to the sentiment of self regard, and again the latter is looked upon as a single sentiment. In actuality not only are related sentiments grouped together by associative bonds, but they are welded into such real entities as James designates selves. Again the self regarding sentiment is not a single sentiment, but in most cases an integration of many—corresponding to James ethical or spiritual self. McDougall's account in general would appear to apply rather to a single self than a complete personality system.

## II.—*A Composite System.*

(a) *Concepts of Self and Personality:* Of the systems outlined those of James and McDougall appear to offer two concepts which are complementary viz., those of the "self" and the "sentiment." In a general way their descriptions of personality appear to be confirmed in outline by the Freudian system. While the term "sentiment" has been accepted and passed into general psychological usage, such is not the case with the concepts of self and personality, hence there appears to exist a distinct need to delimit these concepts. The term "self" often appears where "personality" in the writer's opinion would be more fitting and exact.

The "self" according to Jamesian usage is limited in reference, and designates a particular phase or manifestation of personality. On the cognitive side, each self includes certain related knowledge systems, or "apperception masses" of the Wundtian psychology; on the affective side a congruent series of sentiments are developed;



while the conative side finds issue in related habits, with attitudes and volitions finalised by the same moment or moments. Defined in terms of attention the self appears temporarily to occupy the field about the focus, just as the facet reflects at one angle the full light of the cut stone. One special purpose of the self is to col-late all mental objects within a given social environment. Thus within the family a child's sentiments for parents and brothers and sisters, and other mental objects within the home, tend to become congruently organised; so also do his knowledge systems within this circle and the accompanying volitional aspects likewise. His school life develops a different self to the family self, as the child's group of companions do to either of these. The adult adds many more social horizons to those of the child, hence he develops many more social selves. And the one unifying factor within any one of these social selves even beyond the associative factor is the develop-ment of a consistent system of social tabus and obligations and their acceptances by the individual, these former operating in each case with all the force of a distinct moral code. Such a self is never a static mental entity, but rather a progressively developing or contracting phase of personality. Yet each self despite its varied phases, tends to behave as a consistent entity by reason of its own social code. The set of sanctions and obligations pertaining to a particular self is distinct from others; what is "good form" in one environment will be tabued in another. The distinctness or uniqueness of any self is much more marked in the child than in the average adult, though even here the distinctions will often re-main fairly clear and "logic tight." For instance, the vagaries of male and female evening dress would never be countenanced for business wear, and the table conventions of the family dinner are distinct from those of the formal dinner, while the etiquette of a picnic lunch stands apart from either.

A self behaves, therefore, as a single musical theme, recurring constantly with variations upon the original. Personality may be likened to a complete musical work combining and inter-weaving a number of such themes. That which most skilfully blends and unifies these diverse modes and fashions them into a whole, con-stitutes a finer achievement than that in which the various themes recur disjointedly and lack unity. Thus the higher personality tends to reconcile even varied forms of the self and develops a unity out of complexity, while the imperfect type never really succeeds in making them one. Again the development of a personality from a functional point of view may be likened to the spinning of a single thread out of many single strands. As

the finished thread is wound upon the spindle, first one strand then another appears uppermost. So with the personality; first one self and then another shows itself to the onlooker as the dominant phase, but the whole is finally composed of the unified threads. Snarls or breaks in the continuity of the single strands may be likened to pathological disturbances in this "thread of psychic existence."

(b) *Regulative Factors of Instinctive Behaviour*: As a basis we may postulate with James and McDougall an organisation of instinctive and emotional dispositions as the primary bases of personality. The number of these and the relation of affect and conation is not a present concern, neither is the debate as to whether these tendencies are conscious or unconscious. Of more significance is their relative strength to each other, since for social animals some regulative factors of their primary expressions are essential if two or more of them are to co-operate as a group. Fear and the mothering or protective instinct are very strong in their influence, but in the higher forms of social groups embracing more than the circle of the immediate family, some other influences less personal and more constant are necessary. As James and McDougall agree, the two tendencies of self assertion and submission appear to fulfil this role. These factors are so constant an accompaniment of social behaviour that they readily escape notice from the constancy of their presence. Again since their effects are general rather than specific in their regulative character, their constant significance tends to be ignored. The former of these factors tends to exhilarate the subject and accentuate forms of conduct regarded by him as pleasing to the group, the latter tends to inhibit whatever the group regards as undesirable. The presence or lack of these regulative factors may be found in the behaviour of the average dog or cat. The former from his "pack" origin is docile and educable to a very high degree; the latter is solitary by nature, and, though highly intelligent, does not learn easily from man or his own fellows.

Since man is pre-eminently *the social animal*, so these two tendencies are far more strongly developed in him than in others. Almost every human act tends to be involved with a social issue. The remaining native tendencies in time come to be restrained, modified and moulded by these forces until they become directed into social channels. Thus from a sense of duty a man will overcome his fear and risk his life for his group, or starve amid plenty when by stealing or robbery he might easily satisfy his hunger. Profligacy is, for an individual, not an end in itself but a means of

business rivalry, and the gains will be turned to account in social display. Of the sentiment of the father for his child, McDougall asserts that it develops when the former finds in the latter some grounds for his self assertive tendency. Even the mother's love, though originally grounded in the parental instinct, becomes more and more tinged with the same tendency as the father's as the child grows up.

At the same time, even in the group or social community one finds instances of atavistic conduct; the child, the savage, and even the adult when infuriated by mob contagion or under the influence of passion, yield to strong and sudden impulse and so, for the moment, lose all social recognition of the situation. Since they may thus find complete individual expression the instincts may thus be regarded as rudimentary phases of personality. Even the factors of assertion or submission in the forms of vanity and vulgar display or in shyness and diffidence, may thus become aspects of these atavistic types of behaviour.

(c) *The Social Selves*: As sentiments develop they become "constellated" about a system of related objects, one connecting link being the common social environment forming associative links between the various ideas. The common bonds existent between such associated objects is realised perhaps only when such an object appears out of its normal social setting. Thus to a child the appearance of his school teacher in a social gathering apart from the school, results in a state of confusion due to its lack of relationship with the self with which the idea of the teacher is constantly associated. In the adult, the surprise with which one greets one's official or business acquaintance in an intimate social group is again evidence of this disseverance or lack of association between these selves. Within each social circle a system of related sentiment grows up, often perhaps with little or nothing in common with other social circles so far as their objects go. Oft-times the knowledge systems are likewise unrelated. But the greatest factor of unity within the self is the separate systems of social sanctions that develop within each one of them and are peculiar to it. This above all constitutes the greatest factor of unity and consistency within any constellated group of sentiments. It is far more potential than the factor of association, for it is dynamic rather than mechanical in its character. Such a development is due to the consistent effects upon the individual's self assertion and submission as influenced by social opinion. On the one hand, through special tabus and obligations, he is constrained through the effect of submission to eschew these actions that are



inconsistent with group opinion; on the other hand positive forms of conduct are induced by the effects of the approbation of the community upon his self complacency or assertion. By these means the social group bends the individual to its own line of conduct; he learns to avoid and hate the vices condemned by his group, i.e. actions opposed to its social codes, and to approve and develop in his own conduct their special virtues. It must not be forgotten also that the social pressure is reinforced by the simpler effects of pleasure and pain, operating through material punishment and reward. Thus conduct becomes unified within the group, since it is liable to its censure and approval; when anticipations of these effects are made by the subject, then the rudimentary conscience is born.

Social approval and disapproval then become potential rather than active factors. Even a superficial observation will readily disclose different self phases in the same individual, his different adjustments to varying social environments being pitched in different "keys." This is not always due to the varying mental content which is called into use, but to the different sanctions with which these different social environments are invested. Social codes therefore, are each peculiar to one social group and consistent often only within its horizon. Forms of conduct inhibited by the system of one such may, however, become overt behaviour in another, for each self tends to form a "logic tight compartment." In an uncivilised community the number of social selves will be small and their structures simple; in a more complex type of community however, not merely one but many of such selves thus develop, according to the number of possible environments. The sanctions of one group may be entirely different and even opposed to that of another, as when for instance one contrasts a pre-adolescent "gang" self with his "home" or "school self," the last mentioned often appearing so inconsistent when brought into comparison with either of the first two, that parents and teachers frequently (and quite honestly) disbelieve in genuine manifestations of the latter when brought to their notice. So far therefore, the only existent unity is within each self or system of sentiments regulated by its special behaviour code. Beyond each social self there may be relatively little in common with any other self. Some one unifying factor is needed which shall unite the various non-associated social selves just as each of these unite their group of sentiments within the social group.

It is important to remember that these social selves cannot be regarded as dissociated entities, but rather as *non-associated*;

their lack of unity may not be looked upon as pathological matter so much as one of lack of development. Such a personality will be lacking in consistency and possibly be guilty of glaring hypocrisies without any violence to the psychological condition. The personality of Benvenuto Cellini was such a case: he combined the inconsistency of a remarkable religious fervour and zeal with an abandoned and dissolute life that did not stop even at murder, but apparently he was not regarded by his contemporaries as in any way "unstable." Such a non-associated system of sentiments, since it is dependent on the authority of the group through tradition or by the still more arbitrary authority of a recognised leader, may be consistent only with the temporary and material needs of the community. Thus arise local food and marriage tabus, or the observance of certain religious rites. A system of this kind however is limited in its nature, and possibly without any basic elements of universality of application.

(d) *The Ethical Self*: The onset of adolescence is marked by a distinct transitional phase in which the higher intellectual type of individual passes from the matter-of-fact and "prima facie" attitude towards a metaphysical outlook. Ideas of the "soul" and its relation to God, of temporality and eternity, or of responsibility and personality, often seriously perturb his mind. In the former pre-adolescent stage social sanctions were accepted as self-sufficing, since they were backed by the authority of the group. Nor does it appear greatly to concern the youth of either sex at the earlier stage, whether the different codes of different social selves are mutually contradictory; he or she responds with facility to changes of social environment and assumes the peculiar mental set appropriate to each. But with the self-questionings of adolescence the disparities of the codes proper to each social self are brought under the various categories of auto-criticism. A process of unification then results through the development of a rational or ethical self, as already postulated by James. In this genesis may be explained the mental perturbations that accompany this stage of human development, often finding consummation in the religious phenomena of "conversion." Now it is that former breaches of moral conduct perpetrated in the pre-adolescent period and then readily passed over as consistent with its social code, appear as glaringly inconsistent with the rationality of the new code that is established. To such an extent may adolescent remorse be engendered, that it may develop a conflict culminating in a neurosis. Libidinous thoughts and actions of the early period are peculiarly subject to such action, since a strong sex consciousness also develops at this stage. Freud

alleges that the causes of neuroses regress to infancy. So far as our own observations permit, the seeds may then be sown in appropriate types of mind, but their quickening does not occur till this spring-time of adolescence is reached.

McDougall has insisted on the priority of instincts and their importance as providing the main foundations of character, and thus far we can agree with him. When, however, he denies that innate development of any further levels, our agreement with his thesis must end. The principle of "higher drives" and the "Social Motive" enunciated by Woodworth\* appears very appropriate to the doctrine of the development of selves. Society as a whole, though not in its partial aspects tends to emphasise this underlying unity through the sanctions and institutions of law and religion, and its universality among all normal individuals is assumed by the law in fixing the responsibility of an accused person. The development of the system of social and ethical selves in the normal adult would therefore appear as truly innate as that of instincts.

This progress towards the final consummation of personality proceeds with the formation of various abstract sentiments, such as love or desire for truth, justice, beauty, humanitarianism, etc. These abstractions become objectified by ideals which are mostly personal in character, and so within the individual mind, an "ideal community" is created. The head or presiding ruler of such a group is recognised as God by the religiously-minded, or the group may be constituted on lines of a spiritual democracy of these ideal beings. For arbitrary social praise or blame is now substituted the anticipated approbation or disapproval of this ideal community. To such a "refined gallery," as McDougall† styles it, the individual turns for the solution of all perturbing problems, especially those that arise from inconsistencies of opposed social codes. The ethical self is thus constituted as a final court of appeal above all other selves. Such a system is far too complex for a mere sentiment to which McDougall would limit it, for it includes within itself not only many abstract sentiments, but a final code of action as well. In this higher sublimation of the crude instincts of submission and assertion, personality attains its highest realisation; out of the "mores" of the family and the tribe, the individual may develop that wider system that approaches universality; and thus from being a mere creature of his environment, the individual arrives at a state of inner mental freedom that discards the limits of time and place.

\*Dynamic Psychology. P. 36 ff and p. 202.

†Social Psychology. Chap. IX. Volition.



Though the ethical self appears as the final arbiter in a unified personality, yet it does not follow that the social selves retain no autonomy of their own. As a matter of fact, in practical conduct very many decisions are affected at the level of one or other of the social selves. The choice appears to lie between a constant appeal to the moral self or conscience in very many matters on the one hand, as exhibited in the case of Marcus Aurelius or the mediaevalist, Thomas a Kempis, and on the other the Paulian and practical




DIAGRAM OF PERSONALITY LEVELS.

1. *The Instinctive Level*: The initials in the circles are intended to represent the major primitive emotions. The varying strengths are shown by the varying sizes of the circles.

2. *The Social Selves*: Three typical selves, viz., the Home, School, and Gang Selves are shown at (a) (b) and (c). Note the overlap at (a) and (b). Action is regulated by the generalised functioning of S — and S + or negative and positive self-feeling respectively. The constituent sentiments are represented according to a conventionalised rendering of McDougall's diagram (Social Psychology, p. 125).

3. *The Ethical Self*: The general regulative effect is implied by the connecting lines leading from the Social Selves.

attitude of being "all things to all men," i.e. by placing reliance upon social dictates in so far as they do not clash with the higher moral sanctions, leaving for reference to the ethical self only greater matters of import and otherwise irreconcilable issues. Possibly by the greater number of normal human beings neither the fully "introverted" or completely "extroverted" attitude is adopted, but a satisfactory adjustment is affected somewhere between the two extremes. Such a concept of this unifying factor in personality as here presented reconciles two somewhat conflicting accounts of the volitional factor. This latter for McDougall is the sublimated self assertion developed into a "self regarding sentiment" for which has been substituted the ethical self as here considered. For Pillsbury\* and others this same factor is "the whole man active coming to the point—or as it may presumably be interpreted, the ethical self which forms the crown of a complete personality. But the underlying factor of this is also, as has been pointed out, the sublimated development of submission and assertion. The two descriptions hence are mutually corroborative, and upon this identity between the two the present theory is based. At the same time this final unifying self factor is not the whole personality but rather its crown and final phase of development.

Besides this sketch of an ideal personality there are many partial developments. The abstract sentiments of the moral self may be influenced or obscured by more material influences. Thus sentiments of overweening ambition, whether political or economic, tend to a certain process of unification, but not of the ideal type. Upon these false ideals the individual may sacrifice all other aspects of his personality, as Napoleon did for that of world domination, or Palissey to success in wresting the secret of the porcelain glaze. Considered from the psychological point of view such personalities may often appear as stable and consistent; from an ethical aspect they belong to a lower type; on psychological grounds however, they must be admitted as possible developments.

Pathological disturbances, on the other hand, develop from active repressions. These may arise from merely unsolved conflicts, or in other cases they may have developed so far as to give rise to a dissociated condition of the personality. Confirmatory evidence concerning the innateness of this unificatory process of the moral self is offered in the original and independent testimony of Poul Bjerre, the eminent Swedish psycho-analyst, who styles this healing of the fissions in personality "psycho-synthesis." He

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\*Pillsbury, W. B. *Fundamentals of Psychology*, p. 525.

writes thus: "The healing power of nature on the psychical plane, thus far only postulated, exists in all of us as an innate tendency to psycho-synthesis. Spiritual health depends essentially on the degree in which this tendency is present; when our inward disintegration and mechanisation have reached beyond a certain limit through lack of proportion between the conflicts confronting us and the psychosynthetic tendency within us, we become subject to nervous derangements . . . Here science sets in, having for its task the removal of obstacles for the functioning of the psychosynthetic tendency. In so far as it succeeds, the split and the rigid self becomes a harmonious, plastic and adaptable consciousness. The morbid symptoms fall away of themselves. For all their variety they are but different manifestations of one and the same derangements of the psycho. It is this view of psycho-therapeutics I have called psycho-synthesis."

### III.—*Applications.*


(a) *Conflict*: Psycho-analytic psychology has asserted and demonstrated the existence of many abnormal phenomena which have generally escaped the notice of the regular psychologist, since his province is primarily to explain the normal. When the former, however, attempt to explain the causal relations of the various phenomena and apply these to personality problems, there is in the minds of many psychological thinkers a suspicion in regard to their over emphasis and inadequacy. This is due to the fact that Freud and his followers have approached the task chiefly from the side of abnormality with its exaggerated mental processes. An approach from the normal side of personality, we believe, will afford a genetic better connected and more satisfactory explanation than the Freudian system.

Consider first the problem of the "endopsychic censor": For Freud it exists *per se*, quite detached from other mental processes. Our system of levels of selves based on James and McDougall affords a natural explanation of its genesis and growth as an integral part of the dynamics of personality. This theory is corroborated by the assumption of the "Herd Instinct" and the "Partial Herd" theory suggested by Trotter and incorporated by certain English and American psycho-analysts.

From the action of the censor naturally arises the problem of repression. Freud offers no satisfying explanation of why certain wishes tend to persist; he merely asserts their persistence and will admit no cases of "suppression." While certain "wishes" are crowded out, as Jung asserts, by others of greater interest, there are in addition actual cases of genuine suppression. From the action



of the submissive tendency upon the self assertive side of the censor two types of action may be postulated, the one active and implying "I ought," and the other inhibitive, with the significance of "I ought not." The self assertive side, however, implies a complementary "I will" and "I will not" which transfers social obligation into acceptance and subsequent action. The relations between this "oughtness" and "willingness" may be shown thus:—



The upper horizontal direction (1) represents volitionally controlled action—obligation and its acceptance. On the other hand (2) signifies suppression—social tabu and the acceptance of this acting inhibitably on such conduct. Thus "oughtness" and "willingness" mutually reinforce one another. Where however, obligation and willingness are opposed as in diagonal relationships, the two tendencies appear in mutual antagonism. By a process of compromise this state of conflict may be resolved by means of an associative shift or sublimation. These three modes, resolution, suppression and compromise by substitute response are the normal methods of volition and have always been recognised by psychologists.

Where, however, the conflict persists, the final result may depend on the relative strengths of submission and assertion in the individual's character. Where the former is the stronger factor then a repression occurs; the native inclination is still reinforced by the opposed factor of self-assertion, so that it still persists, but in surreptitious fashion with the possible accompaniment of morbid expression. Where, however, self-assertion is the stronger factor, then "I will" becomes stronger than the obligation of "I ought not" and the wish is realised. But in order successfully to accomplish such a volition the positive will force must be exerted to an unusually greater degree in order to neutralise the inhibition; an exaggerated or over-compensated form of behaviour is the result.

The Adlerian "inferiority complex" is a further phase wherein the individual, failing to achieve a result even by such over-compensation, attempts by a contrary dynamic to exploit the self-same deficiency, real or imaginary, by advertising and even exaggerating it

in his effort to win social sympathy and re-assurance. Even if he does not go so far as this, he may make his affliction serve as an excuse for self-pity, allowing the idea of what he might have been able to accomplish had he not been so visited, to blind him to his own moral slackness. A mild form of the same phenomena is observable in the psychological laboratory wherein the subject according to his own reckoning, never quite puts forth his utmost endeavours. Adhering to this mental reservation, he may permit himself the comforting thought as an offset to a moderate score, that he could have accomplished far more had he really tried.

It will be observed that in our case emphasis is shifted from the native tendency to the regulative social factors of self assertion and submission that constitute the "censor." The Freudian wish thus really represents not merely native tendency, but this factor reinforced by a certain degree of self assertion. Freud has contended that the sexual side is of supreme importance to the individual, since he has found that in every case of neurosis psycho-analysed by him this is the root cause. In addition to the simple argument that any free association method would probably lead in time to associations involving sex, and that, as has often been pointed out, the suggestions of the psycho-analyst may have their effect in associating sex phenomena with cure, it may also be alleged that Freud's work is decidedly empirical. However consistency in simple enumeration of cases does not always prove a constantly recurring factor to be a true cause. Again, Freudians have not demonstrated to the satisfaction of very many practical psychiatrists or to theoretical psychologists that the cause of neuroses is always sexual. The writer has already pointed out above the importance of the sex instinct to the adolescent, and it may further be allowed that its appetitive aspect presents grave difficulties of sublimation for some types of mind. While, however, it may operate as the immediate cause in the greater number of civil neuroses, it only becomes such in virtue of the fact that it involves the opposition of the "oughtness and willingness" of the personality. It will be probably admitted even by Freudians that the same "sexual difficulties—and by sexual is here implied the Freudian usage of the term—will engender repressions in one type of mind, while in another of a more stable type the situation is reacted to through some one of the modes above mentioned. If this be the case then it is impossible to accept it as a final cause.

A consideration of the war neuroses tends to confirm this view. Under conditions of warfare the "wish" to escape is strictly tabued by the obligation of "I ought not," with inner conflict again as the

result. There appears to be no appreciable difference in the operation of the regulative factors concerned, and of the civil neuroses considered previously; the only difference appears to be the substitution of the one accessory factor for another. From the scientific standpoint the former consideration is most important; for the purpose of curing a neurosis the accessory factor, or immediate cause will tend to become most important. We may regard not only fear and sex therefore as such *immediate causes* of neuroses, but may expect similar results when any native urge is strongly evoked and repressed. This standpoint appears to be confirmed by the attitude of such representative thinkers as Rivers, Jung and Morton Prince.

The phenomenon of normal "transference" which appears in the mental condition of the patient at a certain stage of psychoanalysis is also a condition that may be attributed in a large measure to the operation of the factors of assertion and submission. The repressed complex, it is demonstrated to the patient, is not so sinister as to require repression. The analyst acts the part of a "social censor" and restores the self respect of the individual in the case of his repressed complex and assists in the process of compromise which "sublimation" really stands for. Naturally the attitude of the patient towards the analyst is one of gratitude, which by McDougall's analysis contains in addition to the factor of submission a large degree of the tender emotion, and which would be considered according to the Freudian terminology as sexual in character. A similar process is to be observed in the subject who undergoes a condition of religious conversion, towards the cleric who is the instrument of the process. The final stage in both cases is to develop the ethical self of the subject so that the appeal is made at this level instead of the lower and social level and he may thus stand alone. When this autonomy has been attained the process of transference is complete, and the patient in the future regards both the analyst and the cleric in more normal roles. In such processes the regulative factors of submission and assertion appear as the effective causes, while the affectionate attitude of the patient is secondary in character.

(b) *Dissociation*: The term dissociation would appear to imply merely the dissolution of once existent association bonds, but as the doctrine of repression asserts, the pathological factors are not so much dissociated as at first "submerged," and then finally split off by a process of fission from the main personality. On the other hand many aspects of the social selves of one individual may be non-associated with the others without any serious effects,



though some degree of unity will have to be effected through the ethical self if a desirable personality is to be achieved. Thus, says James, "there results a division of the man into several selves, and this may be a discordant splitting, as where one is afraid to let his acquaintances know him as he is elsewhere, or it may be a perfectly harmonious division of labour, as where one tender to his children, is stern to the soldiers or prisoners under his command." Many individuals in the community must suffer from such minor discordancies since they can never summon courage and resolution to reconcile opposed group tabus and obligations. Again, owing to the demand for group solidarity within the political or religious party and their demands for outward conformity, many an individual who outwardly acquiesces does so with an inward rebellion since in him oughtness and willingness do not coincide. The constant recurrence of such a state is not a healthy one for personality, and may finally culminate in a neurosis. Again the conflict may be great and overwhelming and then the pathological developments will be marked and sudden. Often such marked conditions of incongruity of desires culminate in forms of multiple personality, as in the classical cases of Ansel Bourne, Mr. Hanna, Irene, Felida X or Sally Beauchamp.

(c) *Suggestion and Auto Suggestion*: The relation of submission and assertion to suggestion has been pointed out by McDougall. Proceeding further however, it may be said that hypnotic suggestion tends to build up a distinct self, with the social agent as moral authority. Where the method is used therapeutically, the dissociated self is finally incorporated within the personality by a process of mental synthesis. On the other hand where the purpose of hypnosis is non-therapeutic but commercial or even sinister, there is always a danger of permanent dissociation of this hypnotised self. Hence arises the need for restrictions which ought legally be placed upon the formal use of hypnosis, limiting its applications to cases of psycho-therapy or the regular procedure of experimentation.

The success of auto-suggestion as is the case of all forms of suggestion is dependent on the absence of contrariant ideas. The operative idea in all these cases must be accepted both as an obligation and as a resolution. If the "I ought" and "I will" thus reinforce one another, then of itself this accepted idea will tend to become an object of attention, and the effect of the auto-suggestion will be operative mainly through repetition of stimulus. If, on the other hand, the "I ought" and "I will" do not reinforce one another then a conflict is the result. Auto-suggestion in such case is not effectual;

it does not comply with the practical conditions demanded, this is that the required idea shall persist without conflict.

(d) *Motivation Levels and Ethics*: For ethics as well as for legal considerations the main value of the system presented above lies in its help in the evaluation of motives. As a basis there are the great native urges or instincts which manifest themselves in crude forms of passion, i.e. manifestations of the primitive instincts. A positivist basis is thus afforded and their various relative strengths as shown by outbreaks of crime or breaches of custom may be worked out by statistical methods. Opposed to this may be considered the socially-conditioned motive, that is regulated by the social opinion of the group. Finally one approaches the moral level of inner freedom. In this latter case motives proceeding from "dictates of conscience must be distinguished from mere gusts of passion. The motives of the conspirators in their murder of Caesar will here stand out in comparison with the murder-lust of the infuriated mob, that, stung to fury by Antony's speech perpetrated the murder of Cinna the innocent poet. The former proceeded from the loftiest motives, the latter from passionate anger and ferocity. The law distinguishes here between the crimes of premeditated murder and that of manslaughter, the latter receiving recognition as a sudden uncontrolled outburst of primitive nature. In a groping fashion too, in the case of lesser crimes, the law attempts corrective measures for the reformation of the criminal. This can only mean the development of an ethical self in the prisoner or at least the inculcation of other "mores" than those sanctioned by his criminal associates of the underworld. The special pleading of certain psycho-analysts of the irresponsibility of the criminal on account of deterministic factors is without a basis of fact, except in a limited number of cases.\* It arises from a complete acceptance of the Freudian doctrine of repression, the application of which as we have pointed out can only be extended to a limited field. The criminal is anti-social from two causes, either from a wrong sense of values, or from the effects of an evil environment. In the latter case the anti-social approval of the members of his underworld moulds his conduct and shapes his personality. The main role of correction and punishment, if they are to be reformatory, is to emphasise for the criminal through the expression of legal disapproval the fact that his conduct is anti-social. When the individual really becomes "reformed," then his attitude toward the social sanctions and tabus imply both the "I ought" and

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\*Cf. Smith Hamblin. *The Psychology of the Criminal*.

"I will." A most interesting example is Cooley's\* implied distinction between the crude motive of self assertion or the seeking of popularity by a group leader, and the legitimate feeling of self gratification that must accompany even the most unselfish leadership of a cause. Since the element of self assertion is always present, it is possible to confuse the issue by attributing "interested" motives of self-aggrandisement in every case. The Wolsey of "Henry the eighth" slowly and painfully arrives at the recognition of these two levels and makes it clear, when, in agony of overthrow and failure, he exclaims:—"Had I but served my God as diligently as I had served my King"! It is frequently impossible even for intimates to assess the quality of the motive of leaders, but there is always present the danger of a transition from the higher accompaniment to the baser dictates of a self-seeking ambition.

The principle of inner freedom is directly dependent upon and proceeds from the factors of submission and self assertion. From the former arises the sense of obligation or "oughtness." The "I must" implies the fusion of this acknowledgment of duty with acceptance of it in the sense of "I will" or personal inclusion. The volitional inhibition or resolution as well as the process of compromise or substitute response now generally termed sublimation, are the normal methods of the function of *mens sana*. Herein lies the way to spiritual advancement, inner peace and happiness. Though the personality may receive renewed strength and encouragement from the society of his fellows, yet his problems are peculiarly his own. Only by the cultivation of a sturdy inner strength and self reliance supported by strong sentiments of self respect, may such a consummation be finally obtained.

#### IV.—*Summary.*

(1) In this necessarily condensed account there have been presented the personality systems of James, Freud, and McDougall, the first and the last of these exhibiting certain common factors, with certain extensions peculiar to each system. With the Freudian system these factors vaguely appear, but their form is badly defined and their delineation incomplete. The criticism of the three systems may be summarised as follows:—that of James is lacking in content, i.e. of the sentiments, while that of McDougall is more in line with a simple self concept than that of a complete personality system and hence is lacking in organisation. That of

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\*Cf. The Social Order.



Freud, while possessing some features in common with that of McDougall appears naive and undeveloped. By combining the systems of the first-mentioned pair, a final system may be obtained, which more completely explains personality than any one of them.

(2) According to this final system the main features of personality consist of:—

- (a) A basic system of instincts which tends to operate independently as personality phases; among these first fear, and later, submission and self assertion act as regulative factors. The former of this pair is inhibitive in its general effect on conduct, the latter accentuating it.
- (b) From a combination of instinctive tendencies focussed upon mental objects the sentiments develop. Like sentiments are grouped into a more or less defined entity styled a social self, this self being a product primarily of a particular environment. More than one social self tends to exist side by side in the same personality, each self retaining a specific set of moral sanctions of its own. Social selves may be independent and contradictory in their "mores" if there exist no overlap of common factors in apperception systems, sentiments and will attitudes.
- (c) At adolescence a rational process begins. Abstract sentiments and ideal personalities develop, and in place of social authority there is substituted the approbation or disfavour of an ideal community existent in the mind of the subject; this forms the background of the promptings of conscience. An ethical code finally emerges which is more or less universal in its applications. This development may be designated a rational, spiritual, or ethical self, and it acts as a unifying influence upon the social selves by legislating for opposed sanctions, and thus affording a final court of appeal in the case of conflict. Hence it becomes the crowning development of a unified personality.

A clarification of the terms "self" and "personality" is thus afforded, whereby the term "self" is regarded as a phase of the latter.

## PSYCHO-BIOLOGY AND DEMOCRACY.—II.\* PSYCHIC INEQUALITIES.

By W. Anderson, M.A., Professor of Philosophy,  
Auckland University College, N.Z.

*But whosoever shall say (to his brother,) "Moron," shall be in danger of hell fire.*—The Sermon on the Mount.

THE conception of the nature of society held by the biological critics of Democracy appears at once from the character of their criticism. The fundamental form of society must be one based on racial homogeneity, since its persistence is to depend on racial integrity. Similarity, then, is the principle of any enduring human association. But their criticisms further imply that the principle of similarity must be crossed by another, that of Specialization of Function, commonly called Division of Labour. Here, it is true, we might seem to have a social as distinct from a racial principle, but the biological school will accept as effective for survival no division of labour which does not copy innate structural differences. How these two principles, of a purely structural similarity and a purely structural diversity, are to be reconciled on a strictly biological basis—a basis, that is to say, so understood as to exclude any such autonomous social principle as is that from which democratic ideas and projects necessarily arise—is hard to fathom. The fact remains that both are insisted on. Only of men of like heredity can a stable society be formed. Only of men of complementary innate qualities can an efficient society be constituted.

Now if Psychology confirms the criticisms, as it is said to do, it should also confirm the general account of the nature of society, on which these are based. So in fact it professes to do, and well may it do so. We must cease, however, to think of Psychology as specially dealing with, or even emphasizing, those aspects of man's life in which he seems to transcend his physical limitations and be free; his mind and will. Deserting the standpoint of self-consciousness, whose phenomenology it is its proper task to trace, Psychology now reverts to the Aristotelian standpoint whose basic concepts are not subject and object but structure and function, capacity and performance. The aim of such a "scientific" psychology is to show how from what Aristotle called *psyche* or primary actuality, definite structure achieved in living (strictly "livable") matter, we can determine the full actuality or ultimate performance of which that prior "actuality" was still only the potency. For Aristotle himself, be it noted, any such calculation was subject to the

\* For previous article, see Vol. IV. p. 41.

important qualification that the potential can only become actual through the (already) actual. He may have been a mechanist, but he was not an automatist.\*

Bosanquet makes the same point in saying that even Mendelian units are contingent on the environment. Or as Dewey puts it, "In conduct the acquired is the primitive."† This provision is, however, ignored by contemporary psychologists, who would accordingly deduce society directly from the structural qualities of the physical‡ soul or natural "individuality" of its members. Their science they now once more assimilate to Biology. The classification which seems to be emerging is into General Biology, inquiring into general laws of life like evolution, variation, natural selection, and the like; and Individual Biology, *i.e.* Psychology (Psychography might seem a more appropriate name§) which describes and classifies particular organisms of *all* sorts and grades according to their inherent capacities and tendencies. Indeed "psychology" is in a fair way to signify the study of Heredity. Habit, indeed, may point to a different sort of individuality or "soul." But the fashionable (and "spiritual") thing to do nowadays is to refer habit to innate habit-forming capacity. Above all, no privileged position is to be accorded to the mental or intentional; mind is a variable quality of organisms, to be measured by "intelligence raters."

In brief, everything that has hitherto been ascribed to "the psychological factor" in human life is expressly eliminated, and by psychologists themselves. So far from qualifying the biological account of society, the New Psychology completes its theory that certain men form a given society because by birth they are such that they properly belong to it and fill a certain place therein; so that to put them elsewhere in it, or to include others with them, is contrary to Nature. Hitherto Biology could not go too far in this

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\*For any spiritual view of things, automatism, not mechanism, is the enemy. This is concealed by the suggestion of spontaneity which adheres to the former. On this account some psychologists plume themselves on having vindicated our "higher" interests when they presume to have shown that something hitherto explained "mechanically" by association from experience is really due to some innate tendency of "instinct." But in truth has heredity any deeper form of "inwardness" than that which we ascribe to the "inner man" whom we satisfy with a good square meal?

†Human Nature and Conduct, p. 89

‡Professor Burnet (Greek Philosophy, p. 27) objects with evident justice to the prevalent identification of *physis* in the early Greek thinkers with growth. But this is not to say that it had not a biological significance. It appears to have meant primarily what we understand by "stock" or inborn qualities. Reference to specific hereditary disposition is the easiest way to explain behaviour. Professor Burnet points out that atoms do not "grow." But how about Mendel's unit-characters, or the "instincts" of McDougall? These are atoms, and while they do not grow, they are supposed to have everything to do with growth.

§There is too much *psyche* and too little *logos* about the New Psychology, just as, from another point of view, there is too much *logos* and too little *bios* about the New Biology.



direction, because its "such thats" were in the main limited to bodily features that could readily be observed. But what with the mental and emotional tests which it has devised or is devising, Psycho-Biology can give it ten "such thats" for its every one. When it was shown that the results of the American Army Tests had a high "positive correlation" with the number of years of schooling of the respective "groups," it was retorted that the number of years of schooling depended simply on the individual's inborn capacity to receive school instruction! When other tests showed that the difference between the indicated intelligence of American immigrants and that of the white "natives" decreased according to the length of stay of the former, the reply was that this must be due to a progressive decrease in the calibre of the immigrants over the period in question!\* And if a stand is made at the individual's ability in and responsibility for *using* his faculties to this purpose or that, Professor McDougall† will bring up another "such that." He suspects that not only the instincts but the disposition to organize them into moral sentiments is fatally and differentially inherited. The man who devises a series of tests of this quality may fairly claim to have put the "eu" in eugenics.

Moreover as corresponding to the elusive "variation" by which biological species are initiated, Psycho-Biology provides us in the Gregarious Instinct with the means by which are brought into spatial contiguity the complementarily endowed individuals who are to form a race as distinct from a species. This, itself an innate quality, is the all-sufficient "social factor" by which are provided the appropriate *stimuli* for sympathy, suggestion, and imitation. For the social psychologist the type of the community in formation as in action is the crowd.‡

As the result of all this, we have done with the psychology of self-consciousness. It is to be replaced by a knowledge of ourselves, of a character which its exponents would doubtless call more austere, others of us perhaps by a less euphemistic title. The old self-consciousness was a principle of growth. The new is more like a prin-

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\*According to Brigham, "A Study of American Intelligence," cited with the relevant tables in Lippmann, "A Defence of Education," *Century Magazine*, May-Oct., 1923.

†Outline of Psychology, pp. 449-450.

‡It is because the "Psychology" in question has the fundamentally biological character now given it that the efforts of those writers who make much of the accession of support to their theories of racial deterioration under civilization, or of the deterioration of civilization under democratic influences, from the "scientific" advances in Psychology in recent years, are in reality no more than ingenious exercises in the gentle art of making the same evidence do duty twice over. I say the same evidence because in any *practical* question, as distinguished from one of mere scientific theory, the nature of the categories employed in the process of obtaining the evidence is of supreme importance in reaching a decision.

ciple of paralysis. We are left in the position of the unfortunate man portrayed by Henry James in "The Middle Years"—"He should never again, as at one or two great moments of the past, be better than himself. The infinite of life had gone, and what was left of the dose was a small glass engraved like a thermometer by the apothecary."

It is this new self-consciousness, then, consisting in knowledge of and attention to innate qualities and their limitations, whose practice is understood to be hampered by democratic ideas. Thus we find it argued that to the real interests of a community, which means keeping its biological basis intact, such ideas are irrelevant. Moreover to suppose them relevant makes them dangerous. Here, then, we have a *rationale* of all those otherwise conflicting ideas and policies according to which the community has somehow got interests and values of its own wholly irrespective of "mere" forms of government. Political ideals, according to the automatist theory, are mere "projections" or "rationalizations" of racial qualities. Hence it is that we get people expressing surprise when communities of the same "stock" are discovered living under different institutions. Conversely it is strongly maintained to-day that in communities of composite race there is bound to be and remain an irreducible antagonism of "ideals."

Consideration of the sceptical dilemmas latent in such a position will bring out the impossibility of the whole picture of the nature of society as it is or may at any time have been, which is assumed by the critics of Democracy. Thus it happens that in certain communities the "rationalization" of their innate qualities has taken the form of democratic ideals and institutions. These, then, must be an illusion, for Democracy according to its content is a universalizing ideal. *Per contra* immigrants of other "stocks" are necessarily of different and exclusive ideals. Yet there is said to be a dangerous conflict of ideals. And how arising? *Not* by the interlopers asserting their alien ideals against democratic institutions, but their rights under these institutions.

The fact of the matter is that ideals of any sort are not a direct function of anything we can identify as qualities at all, nor are institutions. To understand these we must pass beyond the entire category of substance and quality. Of such a step, however, Psycho-Biology is incapable. Innate qualities are but Quality made absolute. The root idea of heredity is that of a thing possessed of a quality for no reason whatsoever. Its use in explanation implies an attempt to set substance clean above causation, instead of having to recognize them as co-ordinate. In our ordin-

any humdrum efforts to explain things we are satisfied to show that A is B because it is C, while in the alternative case of its being D, it becomes E. But how much more impressive to explain that A *is* such that it is B, not to mention the heights of illumination reached by pointing out that A has a psycho-physical disposition to be B! In consequence of which, this whole region of enquiry abounds in what Bosanquet\* calls Second-class Statistics.†

And the result of making absolute this category of substance is, as usual, that we fall into antinomy. Either the innate qualities which we see behind specific performance are mere replicas of the specific performances themselves, in which case they offer no novel means of controlling or redirecting performance, as qualities causally understood would do. Or they take the form of qualities whose "natural" play would be in performances quite disparate from those with which we started, and "conventionally" desire to promote. This has, as we shall see, an important bearing upon the current forms of "psychological" testing.

But the fundamental point that emerges is that the nature of society is inexplicable in terms of qualities. To make even existing societies intelligible we need another conception, one that is expressed in the democratic watchwords of Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, or in one word, Community. Community is irreducible to any other terms than itself. In particular, any psychology is of necessity blind to it which takes no account of consciousness. For its essence is what we have in cognition, the attitude of a variety of subjects to a common object, or their pursuit of a common objective.‡

The nearest approach we can find to community in biological terms is similarity. But that, we saw, leads to such ideas of community as the belief that two men, each of a hasty temper, must perforce get on better together than would either of them with a man of patient and forgiving disposition. Similarity means a variety of substances with a common quality, not a variety of subjects aware of a common object.

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\*Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 89.

†Where in the absence of any inkling of causation we are reduced to sampling.

‡I am aware that crowd-psychologists make the recognition or pursuit of a common object the mark of the instinctive behaviour of the casual crowd. But such a thing is not an object at all; it has not the infinite relatedness of a true object of cognition, but is, as its exponents define it, rigidly fixed by the specific instinct or emotion called into play. Here then we should have no community, but only similar automatism. Still, the mob-psychologist's account of even the crowd is doubtful. Is not all cognition a self-sustaining activity, or Aristotelian "full actuality," into which we are swept? Compare the language of religion—"Caught up into the Spirit," "Laying hold on eternal life," etc. Even an emergent evolutionist like Professor Lloyd Morgan "acknowledges" Activity as something drawing upwards from a higher level; not a mere felt push from below.



But community, though not derivable from it, may promote similarity in a number of ways, just as it may promote division of labour; it may also draw attention to it, may promote belief in it, even where it does not exist. So it is with those "racial ideals" whose preservation is so anxiously urged. They are in fact the setting up of race itself as an ideal;\* the supreme example of that "rationalization" which psychological science has been understood to expose. The great, and in many respects beneficial, influence in human history of *beliefs about race* does not establish that they severally reproduce racial qualities, since in fact all such beliefs hitherto held are demonstrably false. Their influence is due to the fact that they are the modes in which members of communities have found it most readily possible to represent to themselves their own community. And it always saves the trouble of argument and justification when you can dismiss the claims of your opponent on the score that you and he are of a different clay. But all this, be it remembered, is like any other belief, itself a fact of community, not of a fact of race.

Thus in general the beliefs on which men act in community, what we call "public opinion," are worthy of respect when taken on that basis. For in community opinion is treated as opinion, not as the mere epiphenomenon of organic qualities. The reason for respecting public opinion is not that it is true, but that, as public, it is infinitely corrigible. Community is the sphere of criticism, as it is the sphere of claims to truth. But no man can do public opinion a worse disservice than to turn it "inwards" upon its own supposedly natural basis in exclusive qualities; and all qualities are exclusive. That is the source of tyranny and injustice.

Wherever, then, there is community, it takes precedence of all similarities and dissimilarities of kind. Democracy is the explicit assertion of this principle, as well as the enforcement of its recognition. In human affairs, equalities are prior to inequalities. In the calculus of qualities, inequality is normal, equality the unusual thing. In the calculus of objectives, the normal thing is equality, inequality the abnormal. So we find everywhere with life in community the presupposition of equality in all sorts of ways. The very criminal must be convicted, made to see his crime as others see it, or the attempt must be made to get him to do so. In all conversation, persuasion, and even instruction, we make the assumption of equality. To know, we must know that we know; and the only

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\*Of Tribal Gods we have heard. But the worship of a germ-plasm is an idea to which we may well have some difficulty in adjusting ourselves. Though in these days of Deity regarded, like Mind, as an emergent quality of organisms, much is made possible.

accessible means of attaining that end is to get someone else to agree with us. If it be objected that the other man may not be capable of receiving what we impart, then we must just go without knowledge on that subject. The fundamental assumption, of course, in all such communications is that *res ipsa loquitur*. In a case like that of hypnotism we might seem to have an instance of pure manipulation; but even here it is by suggestion that we must proceed. Biological psychologists themselves at least publish their works, thus inviting the criticism of "arm-chair critics" along with the rest.

Psycho-biology, then, in its reduction of the objects or objectives of men to the qualities of organisms, minimizes will and choice in human life. It denies the reality of equality. It asserts that the assumption of equality obstructs the operation of natural selection. It fails to recognize in community itself a principle of natural selection. It would institute an artificial counterpart of natural selection, hoping out of two artificials to make a natural.

We must first ask, then, what evidence can be produced that community as a working principle is insufficient to secure and maintain a standard of capacity in its members adequate to preserve the values of civilisation. The great source in these days of "evidence" on this head is the results of the American Army Tests, which are quoted to show that at the time of their imposition 45% of the population of that country were dull, that the average adult had a "mental age" of 13½ years, and that 30% had a "mental age" of 12 years. Of course to show that this represents deterioration you need something more. In the absence of similar measurements over a period, then, two factors are cited, both attributable to the prevalence of democratic ideas, (1) the admission of immigrants of inferior race from Europe, and (2) the "differential birthrate," the latter being considered mainly in its bearing on future developments.

It cannot, however, be taken that the conclusion is established. It is not merely that the various foreign groups with which the "scores" of their American representatives were "correlated" are not races at all. No reason is shown why they should have been correlated with these groups only, rather than with others which would have thrown light on the question if the tests really exhibit innate capacities. Thus Lippmann\* shows that they have a high correlation with the provision made for education in the various American States from which the respective groups of recruits came.

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\*Loc. cit.

Further as to the question of "mental ages," it is shown by Professor F. M. Freeman\* that

"What the army tests show concerning the intellectual capacity of typical Americans is that 45% of us are duller than the other 55%." And again, "According to this usual mode of interpretation, ultimate mental age of slightly over 13 means dullness. But notice the remarkable change which must have taken place in the common intelligence if we thus interpret the adult scores in mental-age terms. We should have to accept the astounding conclusion that the percentage of persons who have an ultimate mental age of 12 years increases from 23-10% in childhood to over 30% in adulthood. This of course cannot be, making any allowance that is thinkable for an influx of dull adults through immigration."

Next we must ask if psychometric methods provide a better means of judging capacity than those at present applied in existing communities, and if they can show a superiority such as to justify or render tolerable the tremendous transfer of public responsibility to the shoulders of a few specialists that their general adoption would entail.

Investigation will show that no clear answer on these heads can be given by the exponents of the methods under review, because they are not in possession of criteria by which to form a judgment on these questions. They are faced by the dilemma which is rooted in all attempts to reduce objects to qualities; in the attempt, then, to reduce something that is essentially an act, namely life in community, to the automatic play of physical or psychological "factors."

On the one hand it will be claimed that "psychological" tests are measures of capacity to perform the recognised functions of life in the existing community; capacities not defined otherwise than in terms of these functions. From this point of view stress will be laid on the *agreement* of the results of such tests with those of the existing socially prevalent standards of performance. The main claim made for the use of the former will be that they enable us to predict the outcome of the latter.

On the other hand we have the view which lays stress on the *disagreement* between psychometric tests and all hitherto accepted standards of social selection. The difference is taken to lie in the fact that the latter are "conventional," that they include an element of acquired capacity or knowledge, whereas the former alone measure innate ability. On this basis it is urged that in proportion as social standards are transformed to the type of the psychological

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\*"A Referendum of Psychologists," Century, Dec. '23.



test, a "natural" community will take the place of the existing conventional ones, and the beneficial effects of natural selection will once more be felt.\*

Of the tests thus variously interpreted we find two main types, according as they isolate as "factors" two principal *aspects* of mental life in the concrete; its reference to an object, and its representative or intellectual character. The former purport to measure particular aptitudes or "dispositions," the latter general ability or intelligence. Vocational Tests and Intelligence Tests.

### I.

The difficulty as to the former is this. The concrete occupations of ordinary life have to be sorted out into the play of a number of elementary unitary aptitudes, which are understood more or less to co-operate (or conflict) in it. And from the nature of the analytic method we shall find, at whatever point we stop, that the unitary aptitudes appear as independent variables in different human organisms. Now the problem emerges—

If we are considering suitability of the "individual" to any of the concrete occupations that exist, we have to note that no one of these unitary aptitudes, however strongly marked in some individuals as compared with others, is by itself sufficient to provide for success in a given occupation. Not only so, but it will enter into not one but many concrete occupations. In so far as vocations are, as the name should imply, embodiments of will, they are inter-representative. Surely it has always been esteemed an advantage for philosophy, for example, that its problems have been agitated by men of mathematical, biological, and literary "casts of mind" and pursuits, and again these men have been able to appreciate each other's standpoint though holding to their own. Moreover facility gained in the one field is available in the other. A man learns to be head master of a school in serving as English or Mathematical master.\* Furthermore the special tendencies of individuals, so far as they are mental at all, are exhibited by everybody in some reference, *e.g.* love of monotonous tasks. So much holds when we are investigating aptitudes as aptitudes for concrete pursuits.

But we encounter in this field an opposite trend. It will be quickly pointed out that the fact that existing occupations call for a plurality of unitary aptitudes only goes to show that human occupations are not scientifically organized under our present social

\*This is evidently the standpoint of Professor R. W. Sellars, who hails the growth of mental testing in schools as evidence of the coming triumph of Naturalism. See "The Emergence of Naturalism." *Internat. Jour. of Ethics*. xxxiv. 4.

arrangements. If they were, it is argued, we should have every vocation pulverized into parts each exactly corresponding to the in so far as our social arrangements approach this type are more "natural." Under those arrangements we have the precise adjustment of the task to the special powers of the individual, and conversely.

In regard to the former of these tendencies we are left with the difficulty of seeing what purpose is served by dessicating the inter-representative activities of man into exclusive fragments, seeing that it is accepted that the whole is a phenomenon of will. As for the latter, we see that the "natural" state of society that it contemplates is in fact not a society at all. And as regards its loudly advertised concern for the claims of "individuality," I know of no better comment than the blunt words of Hegel on the allied topic of freedom—The man who prates of individuality and ignores thought does not know what he is talking about.†

## II.

In the complementary region of "Intelligence Tests" we are met by the same dilemma. Either you are testing for adaptation to a "natural" environment different in principle from the existing "conventional" one. Or, if not, your tests fail to give the comprehensiveness of the standards prevailing in and imposed by the existing forms of life in community.

The former point of view comes out in the current boast that an intelligence test will tell you more in fifteen minutes about an individual's mental capacity than ordinary methods of examination will tell you in as many hours. These latter methods are measures of knowledge, of performance based on acquired capacity. (Note, by the way, the purely associationist view of *knowledge* implied in this distinction.) To illustrate from the scholastic world where social selection by examination is highly developed, the intelligence test operates by cutting down the ordinary type of question to "essential" problems. The aim is to provide the replica of the problems our tree-dwelling ancestors had to solve, and thus to reproduce the conditions of that struggle for existence from which the survivors emerged into society. Survival, then, is represented by the prompt return of the "right" answer to these problems.

\*This sort of "transference is, as is well known, denied by writers like Dr. W. G. Sleight (Educational Values and Methods). But his experiments are dominated by an absolute dualism of "mechanical learning" and learning with a view to transference. In actual concrete learning there is no such dualism.

†A special plea is sometimes put up here to the effect that the element of common purpose in such arrangements can be saved in so far as the individual can voluntarily accept his allotted fragment in the scheme—and turn his spiritual energies thus released to higher things. This is based on a false conception of the relation of the conscious subject to the organism, namely the absolute use of the latter as a tool. Here we have the *damnosa hereditas* of ideomotor theories of volition.

Here, then, it is claimed we have an "objective" standard, as opposed to the prevailing ones depending on subjective estimates or special information on particular subjects. Then how is this objectivity to be demonstrated? The performance under test conditions must be shown to be typical of performance at large. Where, then, have we the "natural" criterion to distinguish the objective from conventional standards such as prevail in ordinary examinations. We ought to look for this in the direction of ultimate success in life. But here difficulties come in shoals. Simple survival is rejected. Is not that fostered by artificial arrangements in modern society. Success in leaving offspring, or, as Bosanquet\* with greater subtlety has urged, success in leaving offspring who themselves succeed in leaving offspring? No; one just quotes the "differential birth rate." National success in war? Or migration? No; these things are dysgenic, or as often so as not. It looks—it really looks—as if we were going to be thrown back on public opinion.

"Perish the thought," cries the true-blue scientific psychologist. Is it not the prevalence of public opinion promoted by democracy that has relaxed the struggle for existence and abolished all objective standards? Opinion is bad enough at all times: but when it is public opinion! Well, we reply, we are still waiting for you to show the objectivity of your objective standard.

Now as it happens there is a case in which public opinion has not merely been formed but has had to be formulated on the question of mental capacity, namely Mental Deficiency. In most democratic communities mental deficiency, since it entails the loss of civic rights, has been made the subject of a careful legal definition. Furthermore it has long been remarked that there is considerable disagreement in incidence between any of the existing scales of "intelligence rating" and the legal definition of mental deficiency.†

To this the scientific psychologist of the cruder sort retorts: so much the worse for the legal definition, we have the objective standard. He will not admit the democratic principle that after all it is the wearer who knows where the shoe pinches. But a more skilful answer is forthcoming from another part of the camp. It may be possible to analyse public opinion into a number of factors, of which one does coincide with the natural measure of intelligence. In the public estimate, it is urged, intelligence is combined with an emotional factor, or factor of interest, equally hereditary. If now

\*See "Selection by Maintenance of a Social Standard" in "Social and International Ideals."

†For copious illustrations of this point see Wallin, "Problems of Subnormality," Chap. II, *passim*.



a scientific measure of the latter be propounded, its integration with the scientific measure of intelligence should agree with the public estimate.

Would it? And what should make it "scientific" in any other sense than that it proceeds on the dogma of the factorial analysis of mental life? Professor Terman, writing of the proposal to measure interest in separation from intelligence, sees nothing absurd in the proposal, though he foresees special difficulties. He says:\*

"The need, of course, is for a measure of interest that would be as objective, as consistent, and as valid, as the best measures of intelligence or educational achievement. It is a large undertaking, however, to set about the derivation of such a test. . . . Interest seems very intangible in comparison, for example, with intelligence. Intelligence is abiding, it does not ordinarily take wings, or completely alter its form and substance, as interest is likely to do, the moment one approaches it with a test."

But how complete the *petitio*! Where, pray, was interest when Professor Terman was finding by his tests of intelligence that the latter is stable, abiding, and what not? Since the intelligence recorded is always somebody's understanding of something, interest must have been operative in the finding announced. So if interest is the flighty thing that Professor Terman says it is, intelligence must be flighty in an equal and opposite direction in order to give the "stability" recorded in the result. We cannot develop the "interest" test and leave the "intelligence" test standing.

The true state of the case is that any result reached through abstraction will always be problematic in its bearing on the results reached on the same question from a standpoint that is concrete, public, and historic; and that whether it be an intelligence test, an interest test, or a combination of the two. And the concrete standpoint is the final court of appeal. This is especially marked in the case of mind. Here the public standpoint is the inner point of view; the other stands outside.\* So when we hear scientists announcing with an air of superior resignation that they can make allowance for public opinion, that the public is not yet educated up to their remedies; we may ask if it has ever occurred to them that perhaps the public is educated past them.

Thus we reach the second position in the defence of "intelligence testing"; that which lays stress on the agreement of its results

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\*Genetic Studies of Genius, Vol. I, p. 455.

with those of the accepted social standards, without any deduction for interest or emotion. The claim is now reduced to one of economy of effort and expedition in operation. But now we must ask how long the equivalence is likely to last once we have committed ourselves to the substitution on the strength of a few near-agreements. Once the claim is given up that by these methods we can perform the impossible separation between mind and its world (or rather the world which it is), we must view with systematic doubt the dessication of the "historic pabulum" of mental development, the classical curriculum, into snap-problems. For one thing, has it not always been esteemed the outstanding mark of superior understanding to know what questions to ask: to discover the problems of a subject for oneself? The intelligence test, on the other hand is bound up with the "psychology of the problem"; the problems are all given, for prompt solution. The desolating effects of this attitude may be already seen in the decay of elementary instruction in our Colleges. What with Realistic Economics, Sociological History, and Experimental Psychology discharged point-blank at the heads of beginners in these subjects, there is grave danger of the submergence of individuality and flexibility, even where lip-service is most given to these estimable things. And what holds in the educational sphere holds in the wider social world.

Is there, then, no profitable field of application for such methods? The answer must be, nowhere without grave risk. Because of the social priority of Community, when the nature of human beings is under investigation all our indicatives are at the same time vocatives. Those pronouncing them are ever in danger of destroying community by turning the attention of the individual upon his exclusive "self" and powers, producing absurd conceit or despondency; not to mention the risk I commenced this paper by quoting. The nation which makes a systematic practice of such methods may expect to develop an inferior civilization, however high the indicated capacity of its members. Some scope there possibly is in the diagnosis of mental deficiency, provided always (1) that the subjects have first been found hard or impossible to deal with on general public grounds, and (2) that those entrusted with applying the tests use them in strict subordination to the methods of introspective psychology, and are thoroughly trained in and appreciative of the latter. Beyond this stage the methods referred to are calculated to exhibit a marked law of diminishing returns.

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\*The realization that introspection is the objective and public, and "external observation" the subjective and private method is the *pons asinorum* of Psychology. How many of its professors have crossed it?

But what about immigration? There we are not dealing with brother-members of our community. While community is essentially universal, its universality is of necessity distributive rather than collective. We desire for all the rights of man, but we know that for each these rights must be attained within his own community, which is very often not ours. The State's right of exclusion, and of choice of methods thereof is absolute. But I would suggest that where you have no other means of getting in touch with certain people than the current mental tests, you would do better still by having nothing to do with them at all. As to the urgency of this question, a very great deal must depend on whether you suppose you are providing for the lifetime of the present generation, or for the entire future of the race. If the latter then it must be remembered that mental soundness to-day is no guarantee of the same to-morrow.

The one impossible and intolerable attitude on this whole question is that which declares it to be wholly a matter of administration, to be dealt with by officials and specialists, and not one where theoretical justification is necessary. Public practice is the one sphere in which truth of a philosophic order is indispensable; there is no place here for the hypothetical truth of the abstractive sciences, among which, if psychology insists on being a natural science, it must be numbered. None of the results of such a science are necessarily a guide to the best practical policy. By becoming "scientific" in this sense psychology undoubtedly leaves the "unsettling" group of subjects in College curricula, and joins the "safe" group of scientific studies. But therewith its exponents must recognise that they have lost the right to pronounce on the ultimate direction of policy, and must take their orders from the powers that be.



## THE DOCTRINE OF SUBSTANCE IN DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.\*

By Reginald Jackson, M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy,  
University of Sydney.

The difference in the parts played by the doctrine of substance in the Philosophy of Descartes and in that of Spinoza is the key to what is characteristic of each of their systems. Yet Spinoza's definition of Substance does not differ in essentials from Descartes'. For, if we compare Descartes'<sup>1</sup>

"A thing which exists in such a way as to stand in need of nothing beyond itself in order to its existence"  
with Spinoza's

"That which is in itself and is conceived through itself"<sup>2</sup>  
we observe only that Spinoza explicitly states what Descartes is also concerned to maintain, namely, that in thus conceiving substance we conceive it justly.

Since an examination of these definitions of the ultimately real does not yield the clue to the divergence of Spinoza from Descartes, we are led to examine their theories of knowledge, in the hope that these may discover that difference in the treatment of substance, which it is our purpose to display.

But here, too, a casual inspection is discouraging. Descartes and Spinoza hold in common the view that the criterion of truth—the mark by which we recognise the truth of what is true—is not the conformity or correspondence of truth with fact, but is a state of the ideal itself. For, if we define an idea, with Descartes, as any object of the mind, then the mark, which is the ground of a distinction apprehended by the mind, must be a mark of something which is, at least *inter alia*, ideal. Thus both Descartes and Spinoza hold that, whatever may be involved in the truth of an idea, *we know* the idea to be true because of its own nature. Moreover, when we ask what this mark of the true idea is, we find that both Descartes and Spinoza agree in their use of the phrases "Clear and distinct perception" and "Clear and distinct idea" to indicate the unique attitude of the mind called knowing and the unique object of the mind pronounced true. But an inspection would be casual indeed if it rested on such agreement as this. To say the true idea is the clear and distinct idea is, if we go no farther, an *ignotum per ignotius*. We may still hope that the agreement is only verbal.

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\*Read at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the A.A.P.P., Melbourne, May, 1926.

But when we turn to Descartes' definition of clearness and distinctness,<sup>3</sup> according to which, that is distinct "which comprehends in itself only what is clear" and that is clear "which is present and manifest to the mind giving attention to it, just as we are said clearly to see objects when, being present to the eye looking on, they stimulate it with sufficient force" we remark that to take this as his view of the criterion would be to destroy its utility. For, if the criterion is to arrest a process of uncompromising doubt, Descartes must show that the mark of the unique object of knowledge is, not a more intense occurrence of a mark of the object of opinion, but, itself, unique and unmistakable. We are, therefore, compelled to turn from Descartes' definition to his application of his criterion. Selecting what seems the most promising instance, as it is because of its doubt-defying power that Descartes abstracts from it, we find Descartes claiming, that, in judging "I am a thinking thing," "there is nothing that gives me assurance of its truth except the clear and distinct perception of what I affirm."<sup>4</sup> Comparing this, however, with the argument in the Second Meditation, we see that it is derived from another judgment which Descartes does not here distinguish from it, namely, My consciousness implies my being.

It seems then that "*Cogito ergo sum*" is the most perfect instance of a clear and distinct perception. Here if anywhere we should discover the meaning of the elusive phrase. Now, if we ask what idea is clearly and distinctly perceived, the answer must be that it is the complex idea "*Cogito* involving *sum*," which is such that the constituent "*Cogito*" necessitates the constituent "*sum*" and is not wholly intelligible without it. An examination of the English (or French) version is even more fruitful, since the language is more analytic than Latin. It is now "*I think*" which is asserted to be not wholly intelligible without "*I am*." But this implies that "*I think*" is in itself intelligible so far as it goes. "*I*" necessitates "*think*," but the coherence of "*I*" with "*think*" is ultimately guaranteed only by the assistance *ab extra* of "*I am*." Just because "*I think*" is necessarily related to "*I am*," it is not in itself clear and distinct. No idea is clear and distinct if its complete coherence has to wait on what is external to it. The complex idea, therefore, "*I thinking and so being*," since it is clear and distinct, is coherent without reference to anything else, is not necessarily related to anything else, and does not compel the thinker who apprehends it to go beyond it.

Descartes, however, does not draw these conclusions. His application of the criterion is less rigorous. He calls "clear and distinct" ideas which are but potentially coherent, true as far as they

go. Thus he maintains the existence of created substances, distinct from God and from one another;<sup>5</sup> and his admission that strictly there is only one substance, though interesting as a tendency towards Spinozism, does not square with his treatment of substance. For it is mainly on the ground of the independent conceivability of mind and of matter, that Descartes bases his knowledge of a material world, and this independence cannot be treated as quasi-independence without making nonsense of the criterion. He further claims to have a clear and distinct idea of himself, and even of himself at a given moment. In vain he tries to restore the continuity of the reality, whose disruption his lax application of the criterion has produced. His transcendent Deity is either a mystical fancy masquerading as the basis of a philosophy, or it is incompatible with the superstructure. The creation of substances, the conservation of discrete series by perpetual re-creation, the concurrence which alone is needed by derivative substances in order to their existence—all this is either untranslatable metaphor or it means the maintenance of necessary relations between terms that do not admit of them.

The result is that Descartes' system ends in a sceptical pluralism,<sup>6</sup> comprising (i) a duality of mind and matter, (ii) a plurality of independent selves (iii) a plurality of independent moments inconsistently within these independent selves.

It is the avoidance of the last two of these consequences that constitutes Spinoza's advance on Descartes. This he achieves by facing the consequences of the selection of coherence as the criterion of truth. He sees that, once granted a clear and distinct idea of the self, there can never be inferred from it the being of God or of any independent essence, and that the claimant to such an idea is committed to Solipsism, not merely unable to refute Solipsism, but unable to defend any alternative. For, in Spinoza, the category of Ground and Consequent, implicit and imperfectly assimilated in Descartes' proofs of the existence of God, is openly adopted. The axiom<sup>7</sup> "The knowledge of effect depends on the knowledge of cause and involves the same" places this beyond doubt. All independent ideas are treated as the objects of imperfect apprehension. Time—the discrete series of moments—is but an aid to imagination. Space, when intellectually apprehended, is continuous and indivisible. A perfect apprehension grasps the modes "as things which are in God and which without God are able neither to be nor to be conceived".<sup>8</sup> All things except substance are grasped in their necessary dependence on the one substance in which all things inhere.



So Spinoza sees (i) that we can start with the idea of God=Substance, the only clear and distinct idea, and deduce from it what is contained in it, by emphasising some aspects of its content to the exclusion of others. Such apprehension is all that is possible for a finite mind which cannot grasp the whole in one timeless act. Ideas so apprehended are true so far as they go, their coherence being, however, guaranteed by what is external to them. But (ii) we can also start with the idea of a finite thing, and come to see that it compels us to go beyond it for its explanation, and that the repeated reference to an external ground implies the being of a substance in which all modes inhere, not transcending, but constituting, the modes, and not requiring an external ground, because completely coherent. This—the a posteriori method—is, as Joachim contends,<sup>9</sup> the significant one, since it forestalls the Kantian refutation of the Ontological Proof, by assigning a ground for the conception of that whose essence implies its being. Thus, at least within each attribute, the chain of ground and consequent is unbroken, and so far Spinoza avoids Pluralism.

Ultimately, however, Spinoza does not escape, though it is a Pluralism of attributes and not *within* attributes. The coexistence of the infinite attributes in the one substance is not profound or mysterious. It is a sheer contradiction disguised under the cloak of a spatial metaphor. If an attribute is "That which the intellect perceives as constituting the essence of substance,"<sup>10</sup> then either attribute and substance are the same thing, or the intellect is at fault. But this Spinoza cannot and will not allow. In the proof of the proposition, "In the nature of things two or more things may not be granted, having the same nature or attribute,"<sup>11</sup> conception through attributes is identified with just conception. Spinoza therefore admits that the attribute of Substance is its essence. But he further lays down<sup>12</sup> that God's existence and his essence are the same thing, and even draws the consequence that His attributes, "which explain the eternal essence of God, explain at the same time his existence."<sup>13</sup> And though in his proofs of the existence of God he maintains the distinction, his position is not tenable. In the second proof, Spinoza argues that since "no reason can be granted which could prevent the existence of God, it must certainly be concluded that he does exist of reality." Now, we might argue with just as much force, that since no reason can be granted which could cause the existence of God, it must certainly be concluded that he does not exist of necessity. This argument Spinoza rightly disallows. But his position depends on the interpretation of existence as occurrence, or presence, in a context. Had Spinoza kept

this steadily in view he could hardly have failed to see that an infinity of attributes is an infinity of substances and a confession of the failure of his monism.

But, if the infinity of attributes is a confession of failure, why does Spinoza maintain the view? To some extent he may have been hampered by not having had at his command the later criticism of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities, on which both Descartes' Material World and Spinoza's *Substantia Extensa* depend. This would explain his admission of two attributes—Descartes' two created substances. Having admitted two attributes, Spinoza would be led, in view of the arbitrary appearance of such a system and the apparent limitation of the being of substance, to admit infinite attributes.

But a more penetrating explanation may be suggested. We have seen that Spinoza got rid of pluralism within attributes, by accepting the implications of the view that coherence is the criterion of truth. We have now to see that he did not differ with Descartes in his failure to develop the deeper view, that coherence not only is the criterion of truth, but also constitutes truth. Not till a Kant had traced the spheres of the knowable and the unknowable, could a Hegel proclaim the daring thesis that the appearance is the reality and allow the correspondence with transcendent fact—which though degraded from its popularly supposed use as a criterion still supervened in Descartes and Spinoza as a necessary constituent of truth—to be demolished. In Descartes the retention of the correspondence view is seen in his argument that, unless God created a material world with reference to which our ideas could be true, he would be a deceiver. In Spinoza the same view is expressed in his definition of certainty as "knowing things to exist formally just as they are contained in the understanding objectively."<sup>14</sup> It is this that leads to the contradictory contentions, that "A true idea should agree with its ideatum,"<sup>15</sup> and that "The true idea of Peter is altogether different from Peter."<sup>16</sup> Both contentions are the necessary outcome of Spinoza's system and are a manifestation of the incompatibility of the infinite attributes with the one substance. The agreement of the idea with its ideatum is not the ground of our perception of the truth of the idea. It is the necessary transcendent factual accompaniment of the mark of the truth of the idea, and is demanded by a sort of faith when we perceive an idea clearly and distinctly.

That Spinoza took this survival of the correspondence view seriously is (i) not incredible in view of the seeming indispensability of a world of fact transcending thought, as the writings of

Bradley so abundantly suggest. But (ii) it can be shown by reference to Spinoza's account of the Fictitious Idea in the *De Intellectus Emendatione*.

This account seems to have been misunderstood and mistranslated by both Elwes<sup>17</sup> and Boyle<sup>18</sup>. Two passages are similarly and erroneously interpreted by the translators, in a way which precludes all hope of making any sort of sense of Spinoza.

1. The one is "*Fingo Petrum quem novi domum ire eum me invisere et similia.*"<sup>19</sup> It is rendered "I feign that Peter whom I know to have gone home is gone to see me, etc. This (a) treats the time of action of the present infinitive "ire" as prior to that of "novi," on which it is made to depend, which is impossible if the construction is taken, as it is by the translators, to be that of Accusative with Infinitive. (b) It makes both *Petrum* and *eum* the subject of "invisere" thus making "eum" redundant. (c) It treats "novi" as equivalent to "scio." The only translation which the Latin will tolerate is "I feign that Peter, whom I know, goes home, goes to see me, etc."

Passing to the context, we find (a) that Spinoza is illustrating the kind of fiction "when existence alone is feigned and the thing which is feigned in such an action is understood." Thus, I take it, Peter's presence in a specific context—going home, going to see me, and what not—is feigned, and Peter's essence is understood, (b) Spinoza says, "the idea concerns possible things, not things either necessary or impossible." Our translators then would have us believe that in Spinoza's opinion it is possible for Peter, who has gone home, to be gone to see me.

2. The second passage is "*Nulla ergo modo timendum est nos aliquid fingere.*"<sup>20</sup> It is translated by Elwes, "we need be in no fear of forming hypotheses;" by Boyle, "In no wise therefore must we fear to feign anything." This treats "fingere" as a prolate infinitive, though its subject is expressed and is different from that of the main verb "timendum," which is used impersonally. But this is inadmissible. I translate, "By no means, therefore, should it be feared that we feign anything."

Passing to the context we find that the absence of need for fear is rested on the fact of clear and distinct perception, and Spinoza goes on to say that a fictitious idea cannot be clear and distinct, but only confused.<sup>21</sup> This is incompatible with the translations of Elwes and Boyle.

Considering the two passages together, we observe that, according to the translators, Spinoza begins his account of the Fictitious Idea by treating it as equivalent to the False Idea, and ends by dis-



tinguishing it as legitimate hypothesis. But what Spinoza really does is to begin by treating the Fictitious Idea as legitimate hypothesis and to end by identifying it with the False Idea. I am not aware of any theory which will explain the first impasse. The second, I suggest, can be explained on the view that Spinoza was unwilling—even for so promising and fertile a conception as that of the working hypothesis—to give up his heritage of the correspondence view of truth.

For, the nature of legitimate hypothesis is to cohere with what is known. If it is discarded, it is because it fails to cohere with what is subsequently discovered, or at any rate subsequently viewed in connexion with it. But now, if coherence not only is the criterion of truth, but also constitutes truth, legitimate hypothesis is indistinguishable from all true ideas except one—the exhaustive and timelessly grasped idea of substance with its modes. Spinoza, however, believing that even potentially true ideas must agree with their ideata, i.e., correspond with transcendent fact, was bound to distinguish fiction, which is potentially false, from even potentially true ideas. In consequence, he cannot allow fiction to be characterised by the mark of the true idea, and his promising attempt to anticipate a large field of modern inductive logic is stultified. The fictitious idea becomes indistinguishable from the false idea, unless we emphasise the presence of conviction in our attitude towards the false idea, in which case the fictitious idea becomes indistinguishable from the doubtful idea.

This reference to the *De Intellectus Emendatione* confirms the argument. The retention of the correspondence view will not permit the identification of Knowing with Being. Spinoza could not comprise substance within the attribute of Consciousness, and was compelled to admit first a second attribute, extension, and then, for reasons already considered, infinite attributes.

1. *Princ.* I. 51.
2. *Eth.* I. Def. 3.
3. *Princ.* I. 40-1.
4. *Med.* III.
5. *Princ.* I. 42; II. 1.
6. Roth, "Spinoza, Descartes, and Maimonides."
7. *Eth.* I. Ax. 4.
8. *Eth.* I. Prop. xxix. 8.
9. "Study of the Ethics of Spinoza."
10. *Eth.* I. Def. 4.
11. *Eth.* I. Prop. v.
12. *Eth.* I. Prop. xx.
13. *Eth.* I. Prop. xi.
14. *D.I.E.* 108.
15. *Eth.* I. Ax. 6.
16. *D.I.E.* 34.
17. Bohn's *Phil. Lib.*
18. Everyman.
19. *D.I.E.* 52.
20. *D.I.E.* 62.
21. *D.I.E.* 63.

## PUBLIC EDUCATION UNDER UNIFIED AUSTRALIA.

By Peter Board, M.A., C.M.G. Formerly Director of Education in New South Wales.

THERE are evidences of a growing public opinion in favour of the abolition of State Parliaments and the vesting of all legislative authority in the Parliament of the Commonwealth. This is not surprising. The maintenance of six parliaments at a cost of about £650,000 a year, the weakening of Australian national sentiment by an assertion of State sovereignty, the centralisation in the hands of State authorities of much that might be left to local control, the detrimental effect upon Australia as a whole of the conflicting policies of State Governments, have very naturally suggested that the Commonwealth is overloaded with governments that one central government might well be charged with legislation in all that concerns the nation as a whole, and that extended powers of local government might with advantage bring much of the administration, now highly centralised, closer to the people whom it immediately concerns.

Along with this desire for unification, there is a movement towards the creation of smaller States, still within a federal system. When these questions come to be discussed, the relations of public education to such movements is not only a matter of great importance, but raises one of the practical difficulties that will have to be solved, whatever modifications of the constitution may in the future be adopted.

At present, Australia has highly developed systems of public education, the administration of which is centralised in the hands of State governments. This is a necessary consequence of the provision of all educational expenditure from State Taxation, there being no local taxation for educational purposes. It follows as a further result that the extent to which public education has been developed to meet national purposes has varied in the various States in accordance with the financial position of the States. Especially is this variation reflected in the standard of remuneration of teachers and consequently in the standard of qualifications of the teaching profession upon which the State can insist.

The necessity for providing for the cost of public education in the State budget is the bugbear of every State Treasurer. The budget provisions for public education in Australia range from 25 to 30 per cent. of the whole governmental revenues (i.e., excluding revenue derived from business enterprises), and the finding of such a large proportion for one single object is an annually disturbing

circumstance in State treasuries when claims of all sorts for State financial support have to be considered. It is not remarkable that in all States periods of educational progress should alternate with periods of stagnation when the financial support available depends upon the attitude of the State Treasurer towards public education.

In all discussions of decentralisation, and they have been many, among the advocates both of unification and of new States, the decentralising of educational administration has had but little attention. This is due partly to the fact that the large share of the public revenue which education demands is not realised, and partly to the fact that centralised control of education has not been without its advantages. Yet in either of the two directions in which modifications of the constitution are suggested these two facts cannot be ignored.

Under centralised control the expenditure of the 25 to 30 per cent. of government revenue has enabled the central authority to provide educational facilities in sparsely populated areas at a cost very much in excess of what those areas have to pay in the same percentage of taxation. In New South Wales, for example, the cost of education per pupil in the Metropolitan area is only about one fourth of the cost in thinly populated country districts. It follows that the cost of public education in these districts is largely borne by Metropolitan taxation. It does not appear that the reformers of the New States movement have fully realised this fact. Under centralised control, the distribution of public funds has been such that not a child in even the most remote and isolated locality is left without the means of instruction.

Centralised control, moreover, has secured a reasonable standard and quality of instruction over the whole Commonwealth, largely through the central control of the teaching staff. In small areas, as the example of the United States has shewn, the danger always exists that areas of scattered population cannot supply their schools with sufficiently educated or sufficiently trained teachers without the assistance of other centres enjoying a more widely taxable population.

In a Commonwealth with 3,000,000 square miles of territory occupied by 6,000,000 people, decentralisation of educational administration has its dangers. If Australia were divided into small provinces, those dangers would not long remain hidden. The efficiency of an educational system depends very largely upon the organisation of its teaching staff, including such questions as the adjustment of the qualifications of teachers to the responsibility of the positions assigned to them, the maintenance and promotion



of a professional spirit and the provision of avenues of promotion governed by the just recognition and rewarding of professional merit. An almost universal experience has shewn that where the areas of administrative authority are small, influences that have nothing to do with professional merit are brought into play in the disposition and management of the teaching staff, a circumstance that has a demoralising effect on the teachers and must react upon their work. Moreover, small areas of administration offer only restricted avenues of advancement for teachers and to that extent reduce the inducements to the most promising students to enter the teaching service.

If, therefore, the unification of the Commonwealth were brought about with the accompanying division of Australia into small provinces, or if under a Federal constitution, the existing States were subdivided into smaller States, public education would be liable to suffer materially, if it were made entirely a provincial matter in the same way that it is now a State matter. It would almost inevitably occur that the quality of the teaching forces would deteriorate. In countries such as New Zealand where the province has been the unit of educational administration, there has been a distinct movement towards a greater degree of centralisation as far as the teaching staff is concerned.

On the other hand, provincial administration has definite advantages on the more material side of educational administration. In the provision of suitable buildings and playgrounds and in the equipment of schools and playgrounds, the smaller areas of government secure the higher class of outfit. Partly on account of a greater financial elasticity and partly on account of the rivalry that, consciously or unconsciously, arises between neighbouring provinces, the material side of education receives energetic attention and is felt to be a matter of strong domestic interest.

If Australia were divided into several provinces much smaller than the existing States, while a unified central government was created, or if numerous small States under a federal constitution were formed, public education would find itself on the horns of a dilemma. The local authorities would control areas too small for successful educational administration, while the area under the central government of Australia would be much too large.

Under these circumstances, it would appear necessary that there should be a division of educational administration into two sections, one dealing with material organisation, and the other with the human factor. The former embracing the provision of buildings, land and equipment, and the determination of the types of schools

would be the direct responsibility of local authorities and would thereby conform to local needs and aspirations. But the control of the teaching staffs would doubtless call either for a combination of provinces to provide the wider field of promotion required or for conditions attached to the subsidies given by the central government that would secure the same object.

Under a unified Australia, educational expenditure would be drawn from Commonwealth as well as from local sources, for in sparsely populated provinces, no practicable system of local taxation would give the educational advantages that they now enjoy. The giving of subsidies by the central government would place in the hands of the Commonwealth Parliament and the central bureau of education the determination of the larger questions of educational policy, while the administration in details would rest with provincial authorities. The effect would probably be that, a portion of educational expenditure being drawn from local and personal taxation, the public interest in education would be materially strengthened and the types of schools established would be the expression of the civic aspirations of the people.

There can be no doubt that when the remodelling of the constitution to provide for a central government with a redistribution of local governing bodies, comes within the range of practical politics, the organisation of public education in both its financial and national aspects will be one of the predominant considerations.

## REVIEW-ARTICLES.

I.—BERGSON AND EINSTEIN. By Professor J. Alexander Gunn, M.A., B.Sc., Ph.D. University of Melbourne.

Nothing is more striking in modern thought than the rapprochement between physics and metaphysics. Although the standpoints and concepts employed in these fields are not the same, nevertheless, certain common points of interest have arisen and physics is closer to metaphysics than has been the case since the days of Barrow and his great pupil, Newton. This is largely because the new physics having rejected the Absolute Motion, Time and Space of Newton is thrown back to a discussion of its own fundamental concepts. This brings physics to the borderland of metaphysics. It must be borne in mind, however, that the doctrines of Einstein are physical and mathematical, not metaphysical. Also we must not overlook the fact that for the physicist, the main interest in Time for example is in Time as measureable. The problem of its nature remains a metaphysical problem.

\*DURÉE ET SIMULTANÉITÉ à propos de la théorie d'Einstein, par Henri Bergson, Paris, Félix Alcan. pp. viii + 245. 1922. [Later edition, 1923, contains three additional appendices.]

Now in order to measure Time we are bound to resort to spatial aids. As Barrow and Locke both pointed out, Time will not stand still to let us measure it, and we have no knowledge of equal durations. Our personal measures of time are quite unreliable. When we are interested time seems to us short, when we are bored, it is long. Hence some objective reference-standard must be set up. There are difficulties here of a peculiar kind. If we seek a constant motion by which to measure time objectively, we assume what we are seeking to prove, for we can only recognise a constant motion as such if we already know how to measure equal times. These were some of the difficulties which, while vaguely noted by Newtown himself, culminated in the anti-Newtonian criticisms of Mach, Faraday, Michelson, Morley, Langevin, Minkowski, Poincaré, Lorentz, and Einstein, taking finally the form of the Theory of Relativity (General and Restricted). This brought the Concept of Time to the forefront of discussion.

The Michelson Morley experiment was first made in the 'eighties of the last century and it was in that decade that the Time-problem was brought forward in another aspect. Guyan left behind him his little book on the *Genèse de l'idée de Temps*, which was published by Fouillée and reviewed by Bergson, who had just published *Les Données immédiates de la conscience* (Time and Free-Will). Both Guyau and Bergson concerned themselves with mental time. Bergson had little or no interest in physical time, which in a famous argument he declared to be really space, or the masquerading ghost of space haunting the reflective consciousness, not Time at all. For him real Time was *la durée*, an inner sense of the flow of mental status. All time is perceived and lived by a conscious subject.

The present writer well remembers how interested he was in 1921 to hear from M. Bergson that M. Langevin, with his curious paradoxes about time duration outlined at an International Congress of Philosophy (at Bologna, 1911) had roused him to plan a book on Einstein and the Time problem in the new physics. The book before us is the fruit of that work, and it is most interesting to see how M. Bergson applies his own view of Time, and the work serves to bring out both the limited character of the physical concept of Time and also incidentally throws into the clearest relief the limitations of his own brilliant but inadequate concept of Time.

The work begins with an account of the famous Michelson-Morley experiment. Eddington, in his Romanes Lecture, said that audiences must be getting rather tired of this experiment, but to expect a Relativity Lecture without it would be like asking for a production of "Hamlet" without the Prince of Denmark. However, more recently Eddington has changed his tone in view of the Mt. Wilson results recently obtained by Miller, which being *positive*, entirely upset the conclusions founded on the repeated negative results of Michelson and Morley. For the present no conclusions can be based on this experiment alone, until it is further substantiated and, we believe, until further conclusions are arrived at with regard to the nature of light. The relativity problem can be stated apart from this, as indicated above with time and velocity.

Bergson, however, begins with the Michelson-Morley experiment, leads on to the Lorentz equations, the Space Time of Minkowski and the



Restricted and General Theory of Relativity as announced by Einstein. He accuses Einstein of inconsistency in his treatment of simultaneity in his chapters on "The Idea of Time in Physics" and "The Relativity of Simultaneity" given in his popular account "The Theory of Relativity." Einstein there gives a popular attempt to explain relativity of simultaneity by reference to a man on a train and a man on a railway platform. Bergson calls those two men Peter and Paul respectively. He is very partial to those two names, but as they have the same initials, they are unfortunate. Let us improve on this by calling the man in the train Thomas, the man on the ground George. Now Einstein's demonstration proves that George sees two flashes simultaneously, but also that George sees that those flashes cannot be simultaneous for Thomas. George's reason for such a conclusion is that *be*, George sees Thomas in the train approaching one ray and moving in front of the other. George is therefore confident that the perception of the flashes cannot possibly be simultaneous for Thomas. But this is all that the demonstration proves, as Bergson (and with him another French critic, M. Maritain, in other respects quite anti-Bergsonian\*) rightly maintains. It does not prove what happens to Thomas. Einstein has in Maritain's words confused the perceptions of Thomas with George's judgments about them, which may be a very different matter, and is obviously crucial. George does not *know* what Thomas perceives, only Thomas knows that. It is a fundamental point with Bergson that real time is *perçu et vécu*. He therefore concludes that the multiple times of the theory of Relativity are fictitious, and centres himself in his own definition of time as *la durée perçu et vécu*.

Now it can be shown that elsewhere and not in this popular account Einstein claims without inconsistency that events in one system seen as simultaneous are in another system in motion relative to the first seen as successive. But it can be claimed as Russell shows in his work, *Our Knowledge of the External World* that "the principle of relativity does not destroy the possibility of correlating different local times, and does not have such far-reaching philosophical consequences as is supposed. The one-embracing Time still underlies all that physics has to say about motion."\* Broad, too, shows as against Minkowski that even the theory of Relativity cannot break down the distinction between Time and Space.

Bergson, however, opposes to the physicist's concept of Time, a purely psychological Time. As Plotinus long ago recognised, the question of measurement cannot be the last word on the nature of time. This remains a metaphysical problem. Bergson, however, would have us seek refuge from the inadequacy of the physical concept of Time, by resorting to a purely subjective view of it. This the metaphysician must equally reject. A true metaphysical view of time is neither that of Einstein nor of Bergson. Even Locke saw this and stated the dualism. Kant was aware of it when he raised the question as to the relation between the time order of events and the

\*In 1914 Maritain published a large work on Bergson, critical in character. "*La philosophie bergsonienne*" (Paris: Éditions E. Rivière.)

†Russell *Our Knowledge of the External World*, p. 104

subjective order of our perceptions of those events. The work of Sigwart, Broad, and especially Cassirer, has made the issue clearer. For the psychologist, time is essentially the inner sense of sequence and duration, while for the physicist it is the measurable time of the outer world of motion. There are thus two concepts of time, but neither is the sound and adequate metaphysical view. The metaphysician cannot rest content with merely mental or subjective time. On the other hand, while sharing with the physicist in objectivity the metaphysician refuses to accept the physical concept, because of its limitation to terms of measurement.

Bergson, however, refuses to recognise objective time, and thus he confuses Time merely with our awareness of it, an identification which is quite unwarranted, mischievous, and fallacious. No writer has more brilliantly brought out the psychological points involved in that awareness, but his psychology cannot be substituted for metaphysics. The objective sequence and duration of events constitutes time, but Bergson throws this aside as spatial. His subjective time, is a *durée perçu et vécu*," a personal mental time which cannot exist apart from consciousness (as a complex of memory, percept and conation). But the distinction between before and after, between the earlier and later phases of a mechanism can be made apart from all memory and expectation, in and through the concrete present of subjective time, and indeed apart from all consciousness, as an implication of the causal sequence of events in nature and the successive phases of a movement, and this constitutes objective time.

Neither Einstein nor Bergson has the clue to the nature of time. They are both "extremists," the one physical, mathematical, the other psychological. Bergson's book, however, is to be welcomed and studied, because in spite of its mischievously subjective view and its rejection of objective time, it serves to bring into clear relief the twin concepts of time which proceed from physics and psychology respectively. If regarded in this sense, it is a useful contribution to the metaphysical work required. If it be taken as a substitute for that work, the true metaphysical view of time will be imperilled and postponed.

—J. Alexander Gunn.

II.—MARX AND HEGEL.\* By G. V. Portus, M.A., B.Litt. Lecturer on Economic History, University of Sydney.

Marx being human, his work was moulded by two sets of circumstances—the history of his time, and the intellectual influences under which he came. A man's originality lies first in his conscious choice of intellectual guides, and then in his reactions to their influences and to his material environment.

It is not surprising that the Father of the First International should have put himself to school with Englishmen and Frenchmen as well as Germans. Among his teachers is Adam Smith, Ricardo, and the early 19th

\*"The Logical Influence of Hegel on Marx." By Rebecca Cooper. University of Washington Publications in the Social Sciences. Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 79-182.

Century socialists like Thomas Hodgkin and Robert Crow, were British; St. Simon and Fourier were French; while Hegel, and especially the group that called itself "the Young Hegelians of the Left" were of Marx's own country. In the main Marx got his Economics from the British, his philosophy from Hegel, and his sociology, by reaction from the French Utopians and Robert Owen.

The problem which Miss Cooper sets out to solve is the extent of the *logical* influence of Hegel upon the work of Marx. Note the careful delimitation here. She does not deny that Hegel enormously influenced Marx, and particularly as to his mode of expression. But she does deny that the work of Marx is logically derived from Hegelian tenets, or that Marxism would collapse if the Hegelian contributions were removed. In short she finds that "the connection between the Marxian and Hegelian systems is, for the most part, a purely external and verbal rather than an integral one."

Miss Cooper has not much difficulty in proving her point with regard to the Marxian Economics. It is true that Superficial Hegelianisms abound both in "Capital" and in "The Critique of Political Economy." But all the "polar opposites," the "negations of negations," and the tiresome Hegelian syllogisms are needless mystifications. Stripped of Marx's pedantic lucubrations, terms like "use value" and "exchange value" have the same essential meaning in "Capital" as in the works of Adam Smith and Ricardo. Marx has really done himself a great disservice. Not one in five hundred of the earnest folk—be they red Radicals, pink lecturers bent on social uplift, or true blue Tories—who sit down to the three stout volumes of "Capital" can wade through the flood of metaphysical verbiage and ponderous abstractions with which he surrounds his main propositions. In the preface to the only volume of "Capital" published during his life time, Marx admits that he "coquetted" with Hegel for the purpose (apparently) of giving Hegel a lift. And this is really all it amounts to. When the occasion demanded, Marx could set down the essentials of his Economics clearly and unambiguously, as witness his two pamphlets, "Values, Price, and Profit," and "Wage Labour and Capital," which were written for working class readers. Here there is no trace of Hegelian terminology and no resort to Hegelian principles—not even to give Hegel a lift. It is not, therefore, difficult to concede to Miss Cooper that the Hegelianism of Marx's economics in what the Anglican Prayer Book calls, a work of supererogation.

But can this be said of the Marxian Sociology as Miss Cooper maintains? Even if we admit that Marx and Engels discovered the class war as the real social dynamic from their reading of history rather than by deduction from Hegelian principles; there still remains their prophecy that, after the collapse of Capitalism and the end of the existing class struggle, Communism will emerge as the final and classless form of society. Miss Cooper maintains that the proof of this future communism as the final social form does not depend on any pure abstract logical deduction, apparently because Engels said it did not. Engels did say so, but he did not supply any evidence to show that this prophecy had been empirically discovered from observation of facts. On the other hand this confident pre-



diction finds a curious parallel in Hegel. He did prophesy that true spirit (Freedom) would at last realize its goal. He did put an end to the dialectic process. Apparently he could not contemplate a never ending series of negations of negations, of syntheses that became fresh theses, and developed through new antitheses into further syntheses. And apparently Marx and Engels were Hegelian enough (or human enough) to sympathize with this view and to wish to put an end to the eternal war of classes based upon different systems of production, distribution, and exchange. If this prophecy of Communism as the final form of Society does not derive from Hegel, then where did Marx and Engels get it? It cannot be *induced* from the facts of history. There is nothing in the human record that suggests that Communism will not create different social classes with different interests; and, if it does so, it cannot, on the Marxian hypothesis, be the final form of Society.

There is, of course, much evidence in history of a very widespread wish for a happy ending to human affairs. The Norse Valhalla, the Mahometan Paradise, and the Christian Heaven are cases in point. And the wish will always engender an appropriate eschatology. May it not be that both Hegel and Marx felt this widespread urge to postulate a happy ending, and to provide an appropriate eschatology? For the one it is to be the Final Victory of the Spirit as Absolute, for the other the emergence of the Final Society as Classless. If this be so, then neither of the solutions can be strictly said to rest on logic. But since Marx had been a disciple of Hegel, and the Hegelian dictum of a final synthesis was certainly familiar to him, it would seem fair to assume that there is a real connection between the final social synthesis of Marx and Engels and the final philosophical synthesis of Hegel. The onus of suggesting any other solution of the close parallelism between the eschatologies of these thinkers seems to rest on Miss Cooper.

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## REVIEWS AND NOTICES OF BOOKS.

**SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF SOME GREAT THINKERS OF THE RENAISSANCE AND THE REFORMATION.** A series of Lectures delivered at King's College, University of London. Edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw, M.A., LL.D., Harrap & Co., Ltd., London. pp. 215, 7/6 net.

This book is the fifth of a series of volumes based on public lecture courses given in King's College, University of London. It is the third of a series under the same Editorship of which the two former are concerned with medieval thinkers. This present volume deals with thinkers of the great transition period of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, and consists of an introduction and seven essays on representative men of the Renaissance and Reformation with special reference to their social and political teachings.

The introductory lecture by the Editor is an excellent sketch of background and rightly insists upon the importance of the nationalistic and

economic motives underlying the Reformation. Dr. E. F. Jacob writes entertainingly of Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), scholar, bishop and cardinal, who lived during the Italian Renaissance when ecclesiastical reform seemed possible by peaceful and constitutional methods without rending the unity of Christendom. The "platform" of Nicholas was put forward in his *"De Concordantia Catholica"* at the Council of Basel in 1433 at which he took the anti-papal side. On this thesis was based the Conciliar Movement which, by claiming that the authority of the General Council is founded not in the Papacy but in the consent of all, attempted to apply to the most authoritative institution in the world, the constitutional principle that government must rest on the consent of the governed. Nicholas' claim that even the Pope may be deposed if he does not fulfil his administrative functions is a curious echo of Wycliffe's *"Dominion founded on Grace"* half a century earlier. The German, however, unlike his English forerunner, changed his allegiance. It is true that Nicholas became a papal legate, a cardinal, and finally a bishop. But the trite explanation of self-interest is unnecessary. He was no revolutionary, but a medieval liberal. Reform seemed more likely to come from the papal bureaucracy than from an inexperienced Council which was already stretching out to control delicate administrative machinery in whose operation it was utterly unversed. It was the same dilemma which confronted Strafford two hundred years later. Like the author of *"Thorough,"* Nicholas lost his faith in the reformers without losing his burning desire for reform. And the position of a man who loses trust without losing love is always desperate. The times, too, were ripening into an age which demanded action more than thought, and men rather than measures. Nicholas' political thinking was done, but some of his best work in mathematics, philosophy and theology remained to be accomplished in the intervals of his busy administrative life. He proposed the reform of the Julian Calendar, and years before Copernicus was born, he defined the rotation of the earth round the sun. But these things are beyond the scope of Dr. Jacob's essay.

Miss Levett, discussing Sir John Fortescue, acutely places him as "a typical Englishman living at the time of the Renaissance rather than a typical thinker of the Renaissance." A typical Englishman he was in his pride of his country. His explanation of the number of thieves hanged early in England was that it was an evidence of the high spirit of the English, "so infinitely greater than that of the French of whom few indeed had spirit enough to steal and still less to be hanged for it!" Fortescue is on more solid ground in his insistence that economic and social facts must form the basis of legal systems and principles. "In this," says Miss Levett, "he would have delighted the hearts of Bodin, of Montesquieu, and of Burke." She might have added to these names, those of Marx and Engels. But Fortescue has not much political philosophy. His chief work, *"The Governance of England,"* is an attempt to grapple with the problems of administration at a time when, in Stubbs' telling phrase, "constitutional progress had outrun administrative order." His views on Church matters are quite distinctly medieval, and though as

cautious as Nicholas of Cusa, the English judge is far behind the German ecclesiastic in the range of his ideas.

Perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book is the Editor's lecture on Machiavelli. Dr. Hearnshaw emphasizes that Machiavelli's was a treatise on *real politik* and not merely a sanctified political speculation of the type of Aquinas and Dante; and the brief account he gives us of his subject's career shows us how, almost inevitably, the young Italian was driven to adopt the thesis that force directed by craft was the supreme political equipment. But force and craft are only instruments, and, to some extent at least, a man's work must be judged by its aim. The relation of means to end is a difficult enough problem in Ethics; in Politics it is apt to become bewildering even to men of goodwill. Machiavelli has too often been dismissed as merely a careerist. Dr. Hearnshaw rightly emphasizes Machiavelli as a patriot seeking to re-establish his beloved Italy politically, to free her soil from foreign exploiters, and to give her something of the unity and self-consciousness of nationhood that England, France and Spain were beginning to manifest. Dr. Hearnshaw, however, does not follow this up. This is unfortunate because here, rather than in any innate love of terroristic devices, would seem to lie the root of Signor Mussolini's remark:—"I believe Macchiavelli's 'Prince' to be the statesman's supreme guide." In short, it is Strafford's dilemma over again. These men have lost faith in their fellow-men without losing love for them. Over against Machiavelli and Mussolini and the Prussians and the Old Testament, we must set, not the blunt scorn of Old Johnson proclaiming that "Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel," but the spirit underlying the finer New Testament morality of Edith Cavell's last words, "Patriotism is not enough."

The rest of the essay is an examination of the verdict of history upon Machiavellism as a policy. It is, the author says, theoretically indefensible and practically a failure. Few will feel disposed to quarrel with this. But it certainly makes one rub one's eyes to read the following sentence among the historical examples of the futility of Machiavellism which Dr. Hearnshaw gives us. "In our day the perfidy and barbarity of the Germans towards the Belgians, which they hoped would carry them to speedy victory in the autumn of 1914, were the very causes which brought Britain, Italy and America into the War against them and ensured their ultimate defeat." No one will deny the effect of the rape of Belgium upon Britain. It certainly swept the nation whole-heartedly behind the Government in its declaration in August, 1914. But Italy declared war on Austria in May, 1915. Not till a year later did she declare war on Germany. And the published diplomatic pourparlers between Vienna and Rome, as well as the Terms of the Treaty of London, make clear the part that "sacro egoismo" played in these declaraitons. As for the United States, she declared war in April, 1917, nearly four years after the rape of Belgium, and in consequence of the German Submarine Campaign. Moreover, the confident prediction of Professor Hearnshaw that "no self-respecting power will touch the blood-stained hands of the Bolsheviks" is a little premature.



Dr. Reed is more interested in the literary than in the social aspect of Sir Thomas More, but he finds space to point out (what is sometimes forgotten) that Utopia, politically, was the most intolerant of despotisms. Professor Thompson's essay on Erasmus is a delightful defence of one classical scholar, by another, and ought to be read by every historian who wishes to understand the Reformation from the point of view of the Renaissance. He says little of Erasmus' political thought because Erasmus was too wise to write when partisans were too angry to listen. This essay is a lovingly polished gem. The chapters on Luther and Calvin are both very good, but space forbids an adequate review of them.

—G. V. Portus.

THINGS AND IDEALS: Essays in Functional Philosophy. By M. C. Otto. Modern Thinkers' Library. Harrap and Co. Ltd., 5/- net. Pp. 258. 1925.

The author says of the twelve essays which make up this book that they are "devoted to a cause." The cause is the admirable one of establishing a social philosophy which will recognise equally the reality of facts and ideals and their dynamic continuity. Mr. Otto is in search of a method of "combining aspiration with loyalty to fact." There can be no doubt about the aspiration of the book—"The possessive ideal struts to-day as never before. But to-morrow is another day and in it we may look for the triumph of a better ideal."—one reader, however, has been able to find little else. There is no attempt actually to confront the facts of contemporary civilisation; such ugly facts, for example, as the exploiting of scientific discoveries and inventions for purposes of destruction; or the facts of the contemporary American scene as one finds them portrayed in the novels of Sinclair Lewis. Mr. Otto's argument is safely removed from these things. It is carried on in the realm of well-worn academic and class-room themes. All the familiar quotations are here, balanced against each other until a "solution" is reached. The whole is suffused with a type of idealism which seems strangely out of fashion in these days. It really belongs to the period of moral inflation and of hopes for a new world and a better to-morrow which immediately followed the war. The author of "Things and Ideals" is still filled with this spirit and enjoys an optimism such as not everyone who lives in what he calls "these supreme times" is able to share.

—I. L. G. Sutherland.

MODERN THINKERS AND PRESENT PROBLEMS: An Approach to Modern Philosophy through its History. By Edgar A. Singer, Ph.D. Modern Thinkers Library. Harrap & Co., London, 1925. Pp. 244. 5/- net.

This book is a series of essays, brought together "not without regard to their correctness," which have served the author, he tells us, "to bring before the mind of youth certain problems on which philosophers have thought again and again." In spite of the assurance given us, this con-

nection is not evident; neither does one feel sure while reading the book what questions are being discussed, nor what was the author's purpose in writing. Every essay, however, turns to a consideration of religion, and Kant, it would seem, is the centre of the treatment.

The paper on Bruno is written in strict essay form, and the extracts from old letters about his trial make interesting reading. The author takes it for granted that we recognise with him Bruno's inspiration of Spinoza and of Kantian idealism, he does not make it clear. What there is of Spinoza is an apparently new theory of ethical (it might almost be psychological) determinism, but even the illustration from a book by Bourget leaves us unconvinced. The essay on Hume, apart from some pleasing biographical details, is thin and unsatisfying. The two thinkers are said to be representative of those who arrive at religious truth through reason or by experience.

Evidently the author is trying to make philosophy popular. In Kant, for example, there is very superficial treatment of the problems raised, and the effort fails because it is an endeavour to popularise Kant. One strange assertion appears. In morality, we are told, Kant kept very closely to the Old Testament, but in religion—in his later writing, *Religion within the Domain of Pure Reason*—he clung just as closely to the New Testament. The fundamental thought in Kant's work on religion is the reduction of religion to morality, and with this the author agrees. Surely then Kant, whatever his difficulties and inconsistencies, is not guilty of this.

The essays on Pragmatism and Progress are in themselves the best of the series. The suggestions for an answer to the problems in the book, which they are said to offer, are however, not at all clear. In Schopenhauer and Nietzsche there are two "findings" regarding life, each contradictory to the other; but this contradiction is not resolved, "because the human heart is in contradiction with itself."

The author seems to have read about philosophers rather than studied them. The essays as such are readable, the style is vivid, and the points raised invite thought. As a contribution to philosophy there would appear to be little of value. Certainly the title of the book is misleading.

—W. M. Kyle.

EDUCATION AS A PSYCHOLOGIST SEES IT: By W. B. Pillsbury.  
Macmillan & Co., New York, 1925. Pp. XI + 342. 8/6 net.

Professor Pillsbury tells us in his preface that the book is a Summary of "the main points at which educational problems are influenced by psychology," and that "it aims to indicate what we should expect the process of education to do for the child." For the attainment of this aim three things are needed; first, a knowledge of the nature of the child before his education commences; second, a study of the psychological processes which are involved in working the changes required; and thirdly, a summary of the methods that have been developed for the measurement of the progress that has been made in each of the school subjects."

Four chapters are devoted to the first division. The chapter on *The General Characteristics of Man* gives a confusing and inadequate account of instinct. No educational problem is mentioned and no attempt is made to show how the solution of any problem is influenced by the psychological study of instinct. A brief account is given of tests of general ability, but this can hardly be described as affording a knowledge of the nature of the child before his education begins. The second division is preceded by a chapter on the *Ends of Education*. It seems out of place for the psychologist can hardly pronounce on scholastic aims. He may perhaps point out that some ends held to be desirable by some educators are unattainable if human nature is what he finds it to be, and he may indicate the limits of educability for certain individuals. But the determination of educational ends can be no part of the psychologist's task, for the proof of these rests neither on experiment nor on statistics. As a matter of fact the chapter in question is mainly concerned to point out that schooling does not create capacity, that the school is a useful selective agent, and that the higher schools serve as a sort of pool or reservoir of outstanding ability and so enable those who possess it to be more easily found by employers of the higher grades of ability. This may well be true, but it seems to have little to do with psychology.

The writer next proceeds to an account of the fundamental psychical processes brought into play in Education. These are habit, attention, laws of learning and of perceiving, reasoning emotion and will. Imagination, except for a brief reference to types of imagery is omitted. The treatment follows the usual lines of a text on analytic psychology with occasional references to scholastic practice. But no attempt is made to examine scholastic problems by the help of psychological results. In the chapter on *Habit*, for instance, we are told that the child learns by trial and error, but there is no indication of the difficulty of this conception, such for instance as is provided in the illuminating discussion by Godfrey Thompson in his recent book on *Educational Psychology*. The teacher may surely now be spared platitudes on the value of habit. What he really desires to know is what the psychologist can tell him of the procedure which will most quickly produce accurate habits, in say, working experimental evidence bearing on these particular scholastic problems; but Professor Pillsbury allows no whisper of this to reach his reader.

Fatigue, formal training and attainment tests are treated in separate chapters. In the chapter on fatigue, we are told that there is little experimental evidence of fatigue in school work. This is not so. Mr. Fox has shown that the application of more accurate methods to the existing experimental data reveal the existence of fatigue not suspected by the original investigators. The chapter on attainment tests is too brief to be of much value, and no account is given of the results secured from the application of such tests under precise conditions.

One very important scholastic problem may be mentioned. This is how the cultivation of taste in school pupils is to be conducted. The psychologist might reasonably be expected to assist the teacher here. Whether the teaching in selecting school material follows or disregards the



tastes and interests of the young, he should at least know what these are at different periods, for different social classes, for different sexes. Some few investigations have been made, as for instance, that of Ballard into the prose preferences of school children. Much of the verse chosen for school children does not appear to be very suitable, but before making our selection we should at least consider what children of different ages do actually enjoy. In this book, however, we look in vain for any suggestions from the psychologist which may help the teacher in the difficult and important business of cultivating the taste of his pupils in the realms of art, literature, music and so on.

The book gives the impression that the psychologist has seen very little of education as it presents itself to the student or practitioners of education. Until the psychologist can do this no book of the kind can be very helpful to the educator. The recent books on educational psychology by Drever, Godfrey Thompson and Fox do make an attempt to consider definite scholastic problems and to show how their solution may be helped by the psychological knowledge now available.

As a book on elementary psychology for teachers the book may serve as a useful text for young students. It has no claim to be regarded as a text book on educational psychology.

—A. Mackie.

MIND. ITS ORIGIN AND GOAL: By G. B. Cutten. Pp.xii. 201. Yale University Press, and H. Milford, Oxford University Press. 11/6 net.

An attempt is here made to extend the evolutionary hypothesis from the physical universe, and the physical part of man, to the mental life of man. Not only is this a study in itself as important as it is complex and difficult, but biologists in their study of evolution as a whole have recognised that human adjustment to environment is no longer bodily but at least chiefly mental. Here then, a psychological contribution to the general theory of evolution is indispensable.

Dr. Cutten proceeds therefore, to outline as briefly as possible the relation and parallels of brain and mind; the mental powers and limitations of lower forms of life; the significance of our instinctive endowment; the distinctive roles of instinct and intelligence; the connection of morality with animal impulses and the "naturalness" of religion.

Not content with an examination of the origin and past history of mind, our author proceeds to take a forward vision and speculate on the future of intelligence in man, the dangers of its decay through dysgenics, and the possibilities of such powers as hypnotism and telepathy.

Nothing very new or striking, or even controversial will herein be discovered, unless it be in the author's confusion of the "fittest" with the "best"; his incomplete analysis of religion and his assertion that it is not only "natural" but inevitable to man; or, finally, his uncritical acceptance

of a popular eugenics. For all that, the discussion is throughout simple, clear, well-informed and thoroughly interesting. To those unacquainted with the literature on the subject it should certainly provide a convenient and helpful introduction.

—K. Duncan.

THE RELATION BETWEEN SCIENCE AND THEOLOGY: By C. Stuart Gager. Open Court Publishing Company. Chicago and London. 1925. Pp. 87. Price, one dollar.

Written by a man who desires to preach to scientists and theologians—especially to the latter—the gospel of the open mind. The book is not an addition to the long list of volumes which simply attempt to reconcile religion and science. It sets out to show laymen how to think about the relations which exist between the concrete sciences and theology. The reactionary anti-evolution campaign, headed in America by the late Mr. Bryan, has convinced the author that large sections of the public have no conception of the “method of thought and work by which scientists conduct their investigations and arrive at results.” He believes that a scientist must educate the public on the subject of scientific method. This is his own contribution and in simple language he explains such fundamental ideas as “cause and effect,” “evolution” and “biogenesis.” The chapter on the *Method of Science* will make a new era in the thought of many a well-meaning obscurantist. The three last lectures on *Fact and Hypothesis in Evolution*, *Science and the Bible*, and *Evolution and Religion*, are calculated to make both scientists and theologians respect each other’s domains. The work would make a fine text-book for all young people who desire to know something of “the mental attitude of scientific men.”

—D. F. Mitchell.

ELEMENTARY PSYCHOLOGY: A. I. Gates, Professor of Educational Psychology, Teachers’ College, Columbia. The MacMillan Co., N.Y. 1925. Pp. xiv and 594. 12/-.

The first part of the book deals with the physiological basis of behaviour and conscious experience, the treatment of the receiving, connecting and reacting mechanisms being schematic and brief. The neurological diagrams are well chosen and simplified according to the need of the beginner. In the main body of the text attention is given to researches, past and present, with sufficient detail and mention of persons to fire a keen student to emulation. The important experiment of Pawlow is overlooked, although the “conditioned reflex” is described. A very wide range rather than exhaustive treatment has been the aim, but excellent provision is made for the following up of all questions discussed in the text by the giving of general and particular references at the end of each chapter. Each chapter has appended a list of questions, and exercises for use in revision. The book is well planned, well illustrated and without bias either towards behaviourism or mentalism. It will be of particular value to the

beginner, because of its range and modernity, and in this it achieves its purpose; but it will be of value to the advanced student also because of the numerous centralised references to particular researches.

—B. C. Doig.

THE ART OF THOUGHT. By Graham Wallas. London: Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1926. 9/- net.

A new book by Mr. Graham Wallas is an important event in the world of the social sciences. In his earlier books, "Human Nature in Politics," "The Great Society" and "Our Social Heritage," Mr. Wallas was concerned with the psychological interpretation of the political behaviour of mankind in the complex modern state, and the influence of these books, on psychology and on politics alike, has been very great. In them were first elucidated some of the leading conceptions of the modern political thinker, and while not a professed psychologist, Mr. Wallas has, as the late Dr. W. H. R. Rivers pointed out, contributed far more to the science of psychology than he has been helped by it.

In this present book he has struck into a new and even wider problem, and one of the greatest significance. He is concerned with the process of creative thought itself, and with the possibility of improving this process by conscious effort. "My whole argument in this book," he says, "is that an art of thought exists, that the practice of that art is one of the most important activities of human society, that training in that art should be part of the education of the future thinker." In a civilization which seems to be getting beyond the control of its makers the supreme need is for more effective thinking, which it will be the aim of the art of thought to produce. At present so far as the process of creative thought is concerned science lags behind the empiricism which Mr. Wallas hopes to see it replace.

He analyses the process of thinking into the four stages of Preparation, Incubation, Illumination and Verification, and the problem is to what degree and by what methods conscious effort can control these stages. By Preparation is meant the systematic accumulation of a mass of knowledge and the adoption of a definite "problem attitude" towards it. By Verification is meant the final stage in which the validity of the new idea is tested and it is reduced to exact form. Both these stages are normally fully conscious and logic has long been concerned with them. It is with the less conscious and less voluntary processes of Incubation and Illumination that Mr. Wallas is chiefly concerned, and his treatment of them is of the greatest interest, both to the scientific thinker and to the creative artist.

During the stage of Incubation we refrain from consciously thinking of the problem and relax in various ways, but meanwhile subconscious thought concerning it goes on and results in Illumination—the appearance of the new idea in consciousness. The flash of Illumination, however, is preceded by what Mr. Wallas calls Intimation, a stage of "fringe consciousness" which can be watched for and encouraged, and which makes possible



the control of the Illumination stage. The close relation of emotion and thought is fully discussed; also the relation of habit and thought. Stimulus to new thought may come either through habit-keeping, or through habit-breaking. These chapters and the chapter on effort and energy are of great practical value. Subsequent chapters deal with national types of thought, with the use of artificial aids for producing dissociation and with the organisation of education in such a way as to increase the amount of creative thinking.

Throughout the whole book there is the same imaginative grasp of the issues of contemporary life, the same wealth of fresh and suggestive ideas, and the same freedom from academic system-making as one finds in Mr. Wallas's earlier books. It cannot be doubted that "The Art of Thought" will be as influential as they have been, which is saying much.

—I. L. G. Sutherland.

OUR MINDS AND THEIR BODIES. John Laird, Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Aberdeen. 1925. Oxford Univ. Press. 2/6. Pp. 122.

The design of the book is "to consider the mind-body problem at different levels of discussion." The attitude of common sense is dualistic, but commonsense does not believe in a ghost inhabiting a corpse. Instances of primitive dualism are cited from Frazer's "Golden Bough." Proceeding to the evidence of the sciences, Professor Laird says: "Armed at a pinch with some conception of 'activism,' (or perhaps untroubled about their weapons or their armour), physiologists are prepared to regard body and nerves and mind as a single functional system, graded and hierarchical, but without broad ditches or very troublesome gaps." The behaviourists have come to meet this view from the other end of the scale. There follows, in the light of the body-mind problem, a review of the theories of emotion, suggestion-healing and hysteria. From the bodily side, Laird points to the stigmata accompanying certain types of feeble-mindedness, Lombroso's characteristics of the "criminal type," the ceasing of correlated functions in decerebration, and the physico-chemical side of character dependent on the functioning of the ductless glands. The various hypotheses of body-mind interdependence are discussed, and the book ends with brief outlines of the arguments brought forward for and against Materialism, Mechanism, Animism, Neutral Monism, Mind-Energy Theory (of Bergson), Idealism, Parallelism and Philosophic Dualism.

—B. C. Doig.

THE PURPOSE OF EDUCATION. By St. George Lane Fox Pitt. Camb. University Press. 1925. Pp. 94. 4/- net.

This is the fifth issue, revised and enlarged, of a work first published in 1913, and previously reviewed in this Journal. The main additions have been made in the economic section, dealing with the latest aspects of the currency question the interest in which has much increased of late, owing to

recent political developments." The author regards this as "an urgent educational matter, for the ignorance and mental confusion prevailing on such topics in nearly every section of the community is a real danger to its healthful existence."

**DIE PSYCHISCHEN STÖRUNGEN DER MÄNNLICHEN POTENZ.** Ihre Tragweite und ihre Behandlung. By Dr. Maxim-Steiner, Specialist for Sexual Disorders, Vienna. Third Revised Edition. Published by Franz Deuticke, Leipzig and Vienna. 1926.

From Harrap and Co., London:

"The Boy Through the Ages." By D. M. Stuart, with 200 illustrations. Pp. 288.

"Little Stories to Tell." 300 stories re-told by F. H. Lee. Pp. 288. 3/6 net.

"Early European History to the Fall of Rome." A. Duthie. (Readings from Great Historians, Vol. 4). Pp. 404. 4/6 net.

"European History from the Eve of the French Revolution to the Eve of the Great War." (Readings from Great Historians, Vol. 6). D. M. Kettelbey. Pp. 439. 4/6 net.

"French Prose for Early Stages." P. L. Murphy. Pp. 96. 1/6.

## JOURNALS RECEIVED.

**BRITISH JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES.** Edited by S. E. Hooper. Quarterly. 14/- per annum. London. Macmillan and Co.

Vol. I. No. 2. April, 1926. The Primitive and the Civilised Mind: N. Lossky. Behaviourism and the Guidance of Action: C. Lloyd Morgan. The Idealism of Caird and Jones: A. D. Lindsay. The Mechanism of Life: J. Johnstone. Science and Social Vision: J. W. Scott. Intellectual Analysis and Aesthetic Appreciation: L. Arnaud Reid. The Problem of Colours in Relation to the Idea of Equality: Sir F. Lugard, M. Ginsberg, and H. A. Wyndham.

**JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY:** Edited by Professors Woodbridge and Bush, Columbia University. Published fortnightly: 4 dollars a year.

Vol. XXIII. No. 6. March 4, 1926. The Spirituality of Time: W. H. Sheldon. No. 7. April 1. The Metaphysics of *Leading Principles*: S. Hook. Gentile and the Hegelian Invasion of Italy: G. Boas. No. 8. April 15. Professor Whitehead's "Perceptual Object": L. S. Stebbing. Intelligence and Morals: H. W. Schneider. No. 9. April 29. Esthetic and the Rational Ideal, I: E. A. Singer, Jr. Possibility and Becoming: R. Demos. Emergence: S. C. Pepper. No. 10. May 13. Events and the Future: J. Dewey. Esthetic and the Rational Ideal, II: E. A. Singer, Jr. Towards an Accurate Understanding of Spinoza: H. H. Wolfson. No. 11. May 27. Esthetic and the Rational Ideal, III: E. A. Singer, Jr. 27th Meeting of Western Div. of Am. Phil. Assn.: S. P. Lamprecht. On Mathematical Logic: H. R.



Smart. No. 12. June 10. The Humanistic Study of Change in Time: F. J. Teggart. Science as Symbol and as Description: R. H. Dotterer. The Significance of Artistic Form: H. E. Cory. No. 13. June 24. Evolution in Morals or the Evolution of Morals?: A. G. A. Balz. General Solution of Multiple Implication: H. B. Smith.

PSYCHE: Edited by C. K. Ogden. Kegan Paul, Trench, Truebner & Co. London. Published quarterly. 5/-.

No. 24. April 1926. Editorial: "Vested Interests." Hunting and Thinking: R. L. Thompson. Bodies as Minds: C. K. Ogden. The Role of Myth in Life: B. Malinowski. The Finalistic Aspects of Life: E. Rignano. The Problem of Intelligence: C. A. Claremont. The Morbid Mind: C. Blondel. Snake Symbolism in Dreams.

INTERNATIONAL ORGAN OF PSYCHO-ANALYSIS. Official organ of the International Psycho-Analytical Association. Baillière, Tindall & Co. London. 30/- per annum.

Vol. VII. Part 2. April 1926. Obituary and Bibliography: Karl Abraham. Psycho-Analytical notes of Coué's method of self-mastery: K. Abraham. Character-formation on the genital level of libido-development: K. Abraham. Shorter communications, abstracts, book reviews, and bulletin in the International Psycho-Analytic Association.

ARCHIVIO GENERALE DI NEUROLOGIA, PSICHIATRIA E PSICOANALISI. Ed. M. Levi-Bianchini, official organ of the Italian Psycho-analytic Society. Annual subscription (outside Italy), 6 dollars.

Vol. VII. No. 1. March 1926. Il nucleo centrale della psicoanalisi e la presa di possesso della psicoanalisi in Italia: M. Levi-Bianchini. Un caso raro di malattia di Recklinghausen: V. Charriot. In tema di "Psicopatologia della vita quotidiana: G. Dalma. Sur l'état marbré du striatum: C. Vogt. La rigidité pallidale et la rigidité progressive: C. I. Urechia e S. Michalescu. Bibliografia, etc.

ARCHIVOS BRASILEIROS DE HIGIENE MENTAL. Official Organ of the Brazilian League of Mental Hygiene. Rio de Janeiro. Anno I. Nos. 1 and 2. March and December. 1925.

WELFARE WORK. Journal of the Institute of Industrial Welfare. Monthly. London. 5/- per annum.

SCHOOLING. Published by Teachers' College Press, Sydney. 5/- per annum.

Vol. IX. No. 3. April 1926. The Primary Curriculum: T. T. Roberts. Elementary and Grammar Schools of the Middle Ages: P. R. Cole. Inspirational Teaching: G. Mackaness. No. 4. June 1926. Editorial Notes:



A. Mackie. *The Poetry of Kendall*: P. R. Cole. *Inspirational Teaching*: G. Mackaness. William Wilkins: G. A. Patterson.

THE MEDICAL JOURNAL OF AUSTRALIA. Sydney. Published weekly. 1/-.

THE LEGAL JOURNAL. Sydney. Published monthly. 10/6 per annum

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### NOTES AND NEWS.

It is proposed to erect, in memory of the late Professor Bernard Muscio, a bronze relief portrait with appropriate setting and inscription, in or near the Philosophy Lecture Room, Sydney University. Estimated cost, £150. Subscriptions are now being received by the Registrar of the University.

At a meeting of the Sydney Local Branch of the A.A.P.P., on 5th August, at the University, a lecture on *The Belief in Immortality*, was delivered by the newly appointed Professor of Anthropology. Mr. A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, M.A.

The Auckland Branch of the A.A.P.P. has held a successful course of public lectures, May-August, 1926. "*The Uses and Humours of Philosophy*": Rev. A. Thornhill. "*Xenophanes, an Old-World Rationalist*": Dr. Rantson. "*Seasonal Fluctuations in Human Behaviour*": Professor Fitt. "*Mechanism*": Professor Anderson.

A new number of our Monograph Series has now been published (see advertisement on cover), "*Brain Capacity and Intelligence*," by Professor Morris Miller, Director of the State Psychological Clinic, Hobart.